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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SACRIFICING THE

GOOD OF THE

FEW FOR THE GOOD OF THE MANY: DENYING THE TERMINALLY
ILL ACCESS TO EXPERIMENTAL MEDICATION

INTRODUCTION

In January of 2008, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on a
case that began with the death of a twenty-one year old woman
named Abigail Burroughs.1 In 2001, Abigail lost a two-year fight
with squamous cell carcinoma, a type of non-melanoma skin can
cer. 2 Squamous cell carcinoma is the second most common form of
skin cancer3 -it is estimated to occur domestically in two- to three
hundred thousand people each year. 4 The American Cancer Soci
ety estimates that one- to two-thousand people die each year from
skin cancers other than melanoma, including squamous cell carci
noma. s This type of cancer is usually very treatable,6 but life threat
ening when it spreads to a person's organs.7
During her treatment, Abigail and her family learned of Er
bitux, an experimental cancer drug that demonstrated promising re
sults during early trials. 8 At the time, Erbitux was in the clinical
1. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Won't Hear Appeal on Drugs for
Terminally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,2008, at A15.
2. Sue Kovach, The Abigail Alliance: Motivated by Tragic Circumstances, Families
Battle an Uncaring Bureaucracy, LIFE EXTENSION, Sept. 2007, at 25, 25-26; see also
Mark Thornton, Editorial, The Clinical Trial, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12,2007, at A14 (noting
the death of Abigail Burroughs due to "a rare form of cancer").
3. Skin Cancer Foundation, Squamous Cell Carcinoma, http://www.skincancer.
org/contentlview/23/81 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
4. American Cancer Society, What are the Key Statistics About Squamous and
Basal Cell Skin Cancer?, http://www.cancer.org/docrootlCRIIcontent/CRC2_4_1X_
What_are_the_key_statistics_for_skin3ancer_51.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2009); see
also Skin Cancer Foundation, supra note 3 (noting that there are "over 250,000 new
cases per year estimated in the United States").
5. See American Cancer Society, supra note 4 (noting that the number of people
who die from squamous cell skin cancer each year is unknown).
6. AM. CANCER SOC'y, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2008, at 19 (2008), http://
www.cancer.org/downloads/STT/2008CAFFfinalsecured.pdf (characterizing most forms
of squamous cell carcinoma as "highly curable").
7. Skin Cancer Foundation, supra note 3.
8. Kovach, supra note 2, at 26; see also Complaint at 7, Abigail Alliance for Bet
ter Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No. 03-1601, 2004 WL 3777340
535
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trial phase of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) evalua
tion process for new drugs. 9 Abigail was not eligible to participate
in the clinical trial,10 and the manufacturer was unwilling to provide
it under the FDA's treatment-use exception. l l Abigail spent the
last seven months of her life trying to gain access to Erbitux in the
hope that the drug could prolong her life. 12
In February, 2004, Erbitux was approved "to treat patients
with advanced colorectal cancer that has spread to other parts of
(D.D.C. Aug. 30,2004), rev'd sub nom. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Develop
mental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane, 495
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008); FDA Extends Indications
for Erbitux, 25 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 291, 291 (2006) (reporting that the use of
Erbitux in clinical trials, along with radiation, "extended patient survival by more than
[twenty] months"); Editorial, Drug Reckoning, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2006, at A14 (not
ing that, as early as 2000, an FDA medical reviewer acknowledged there was "ex
tremely compelling" evidence for use of Erbitux in head and neck cancer); Judy
Foreman, For Some, Untested Drug Is a Last Chance, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 2003, at
C3 (observing that Iressa, a drug similar to Erbitux, was approved by the FDA in May
2003).
9. Press Release, ImClone Sys. Inc., Data Presented on Anti-Tumor Activity of
Erbitux (Cetuximab) as a Single-Agent and in Combination with Widely-Used Three
Drug Chemotherapy in Colorectal Carcinoma (May 19, 2002), http://phx.corporate-ir.
netlphoenix.zhtml?c=97689&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=569027&highlight= (indicating
results from a Phase II clinical trial designed to study the effects of Erbitux on
colorectal cancer); see also Peter M. Currie, Note, Restricting Access to Unapproved
Drugs: A Compelling Government Interest?, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 309, 313 (2007) (describ
ing the clinical trial process).
10. Kovach, supra note 2, at 26. During Abigail's illness, the clinical trials for
Erbitux were being conducted to study its effectiveness for colorectal cancer. Id. Abi
gail Burroughs was ineligible for these trials because she was suffering from head and
neck cancer. After Abigail had already died, further clinical trials studied the effects of
Erbitux in head and neck cancer. Id. at 27; see also Complaint, supra note 8, at 7
(recounting the clinical trials on the type of cancer that killed Abigail Burroughs); Fore
man, supra note 8 (noting that Abigail Burroughs was denied access to an experimental
cancer drug under a treatment use program because she "had the wrong kind of
cancer").
11. See Complaint, supra note 8, at 6 ("Existing 'compassionate use' programs for
new drugs, under which drug companies may opt voluntarily to provide drugs to a lim
ited number of patients during [the] pre-approval period, accommodate only a small
number of patients ... because drug sponsors may not charge more than a cost recovery
amount to participants."); PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECrING AMERICA'S HEALTH: THE
FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 244 (2003) (noting that
patients in clinical trials need to be "relatively similar in age, background, and state of
disease" in order to be sure "that any result could be clearly attributed to the drug");
see infra discussion Part l.A.2 for more information on early access exceptions.
12. Kovach, supra note 2, at 26; see also Andrew Pollack, Court Rejects Patient
Right to Use Drugs Being Tested, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at A12 ("Abigail [Bur
roughs] died from cancer after a long battle to receive treatment with experimental
drugs that were eventually approved.").
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the body."13 Two years later, in 2006, the FDA also approved the
use of Erbitux for the treatment of advanced squamous cell carci
noma-the same type of cancer that killed Abigail Burroughs five
years earlier. 14 Because of the widely established practice of pre
scribing drugs off-label, a patient with squamous cell carcinoma
could likely have been able to receive this potentially lifesaving
drug as early as 2004.1 5 The clinical studies of Erbitux have shown
that the drug can lower the risk of disease progression and reduce
the possibility of death in patients who receive the drug as part of a
treatment program that also includes radiotherapy.16
The Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental
Drugs, founded shortly after her death by her father, Frank Bur
roughs, is a non-profit group that advocates for patients diagnosed
with life-threatening illnessesY Its members seek increased access
13. Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Approves Erbitux for
Colorectal Cancer (Feb. 12, 2004), http://www.fda.govlbbs/topicsINEWS/2004INEW
0l024.html; see also FDA Extends Indications for Erbitux, supra note 8, at 291 (report
ing that the FDA approved Erbitux in 2004 for the treatment of colorectal cancer);
Editorial, Erbitux for Americans Too, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2003, at A16 (noting that in
2003, Switzerland was the first country to approve the sale of Erbitux).
14. See FDA Extends Indications for Erbitux, supra note 8, at 291; see also U.S.
Food and Drug Admin., Erbitux (cetuximab) Approved for Use in Combination with
Radiation Therapy, http://www.fda.gov/cder/Offices/OODP/whatsnew/cetuximab.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (noting that Erbitux was approved for use in squamous cell
cancers of the head and neck in 2006).
15. See David G. Adams, The Food and Drug Administration's Regulation of
Health Care Professionals, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION 423, 425
(David G. Adams, Richard M. Cooper & Jonathan S. Kahan eds., 1997) (noting that the
"off-label use of approved drugs" is the most notable practice "not subject to regulation
under the FDCA"); Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of
FDA-Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L.
REV. 181, 186-87 (1999); Richard Miller, Editorial, "Choice" in Health Care, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 27, 2007, at A17 (discussing "off-label use of cancer drugs"). A drug prescribed
for a use other than the one for which it was approved is prescribed off label. Salbu,
supra at 188. Drugs may only be marketed for the specific diseases for which they have
been approved, but doctors are not similarly regulated by the FDA. Id. at 189. In fact,
once a drug is approved for use by the FDA, a doctor can prescribe it to a patient for
any use. Id. at 188.
16. James A. Bonner et aI., Radiotherapy Plus Cetuximab for Squamous-Cell Car
cinoma of the Head and Neck, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 567, 572 (2006); see also Marshall
R. Posner & Lori J. Worth, Cetuximab and Radiotherapy for Head and Neck Cancer,
354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 634 (2006) (noting the "unquestionable improvement in locore
gional control, progression-free survival, and overall survival among patients treated
with cetuximab plus radiotherapy"); Drug Reckoning, supra note 8 (reporting that Er
bitux tests indicated an increased survival rate of twenty months in cancer patients).
17. Kovach, supra note 2, at 30; see also Editorial, If All Else Fails, Let the Dying
Try Unapproved Drugs, USA TODAY, Aug. 21, 2007, at lOA [hereinafter If All Else
Fails ].
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and early-use programs for experimental cancer drugs for patients
who have exhausted other available treatment options. 18 In pursuit
of this objective, the Alliance submitted a petition to the FDA seek
ing to amend certain FDA regulations. 19 The proposed changes,
which were not enacted by the FDA, would have simplified the pro
cess for terminally ill patients to access experimental drugs. 20
When the FDA failed to respond favorably to the petition, the Alli
ance brought its argument to the federal courtS.21
Part I of this Note will discuss how new "experimental" drugs
gain FDA approval, including an overview of the clinical trial pro
cess and one of the methods of early access. Part I will also discuss
the history of the major drug regulations enacted in the United
States, both decisions issued by the court of appeals in the two Abi
gail Alliance cases, as well as the process used by courts to analyze
fundamental rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part II will analyze how the asserted right was
framed in both appellate decisions, the historical inaccuracies that
18. The Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, The Abigail
Alliance Mission, http://abigail-alliance.org/mission.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2009); see
also Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
(Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en bane), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 1069 (2008); Foreman, supra note 8 (noting that the Abigail Alliance is seeking
changes to FDA regulations that would allow terminally ill patients to have wider ac
cess to experimental drugs).
19. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 699; see also Citizen Petition, 21 C.F.R. § 10.30
(2008) (describing the requirements for the submission of a citizen petition to the FDA
to seek alterations to existing regulations); FDA Treatment Use of an Investigational
New Drug, 21 c.F.R. § 312.34 (describing the treatment-use exception to the clinical
trial phase, which the Alliance sought to amend to ease the process for terminally ill
patients to gain access to experimental drugs); Citizen Petition of the Abigail Alliance
& the Washington Legal Found. to the Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs. (June 11, 2003), http://abigail-alliance.orglWLF_FDA.pdf [hereinafter
Citizen Petition] (detailing the changes that the Alliance was seeking to make to 21
C.F.R. § 312.34); see infra Part I. A.1-2 for information regarding the approval process
for new drugs and for treatment Investigational New Drugs (IND).
20. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 699-700; see also Citizen Petition, supra note
19; Foreman, supra note 8 (noting that the Alliance was seeking a new level of ap
proval-"Tier 1 Initial Approval"-to allow access to experimental drugs that had suc
cessfully completed the first phase of the clinical trial process); infra notes 53 and 63 for
information regarding the Alliance's proposed changes to the FDA regulations gov
erning access to experimental drugs.
21. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No.
03-1601,2004 WL 3777340 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004), rev'd sub nom. Abigail Alliance for
Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir.
2006), vacated en bane, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), eert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069
(2008).

THE GOOD OF THE FEW

2009]

539

the en banc court relied on to support its decision, and alternative
considerations that failed to capture that court's attention.
The ultimate conclusion of this Note is that the initial appellate
decision 22 took the proper approach to the issues presented by the
Alliance. Both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend
ment and Supreme Court precedent support the right for mentally
competent, terminally ill patients, with no other viable means of
treatment, to make reasoned and informed decisions regarding
their own treatment. If an individual elects to attempt to prolong
his life by undergoing treatment with experimental medications, the
FDA should not impose a barrier to access simply because it has
not conclusively determined the safety and efficacy of the
medication.
I.

A.

THE UNDERLYING ISSUES

FDA New Drug Approval Process and Treatment Exception
1.

New Drug Approval Process

Access to experimental drugs is governed by the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),23 which blocks access to all drugs
before they have been approved by the FDA.24 The FDA's ap
proval process requires "substantial evidence"25 that the drug will
achieve the effects claimed under its prescribed uses before it can

22. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane, 495 F.3d
695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
23. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.c. §§ 301-392 (2000).
24. Abigail Alliance l/, 495 F.3d at 697; see also 21 U.S.c. § 355(a) ("No person
shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, un
less an approval of an application ... is effective with respect to such drug."); Steven
Goldberg, Technology Unbound: Will Funded Libertarianism Dominate the Future?, 18
STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 21, 23 (2007) ("A new drug cannot be marketed until the FDA
determines it is safe and effective.").
25. 21 U.S.c. § 355(d)(5). See generally, Geoffrey M. Levitt, James N. Czaban &
Andrea S. Paterson, Human Drug Regulation, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REG
ULATION, supra note 15, at 159-204 (providing a broad overview of the FDA's drug
review process).
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be sold by manufacturers to the public. 26 This evidence is gathered
during a lengthy clinical trial process with human subjects. 27
Before clinical trials begin on humans, drug companies usually
test on laboratory animals to gain an understanding of the drug's
effect and potential toxicity.28 Following this research, if the drug is
sufficiently promising, the manufacturer will submit an Investiga
tional New Drug (IND) application to the FDA to begin clinical
testing on humans. 29 After submitting this application, the manu
facturer begins the clinical trial process, which is controlled by FDA
regulations and requires three phases of clinical trials. 30 During
these phases, researchers gradually increase the number of humans
taking the experimental medication while gathering data concern
ing the safety and efficacy of the medication. 3l Phase I focuses pri
marily on the safety of the drug and its side effects.32 Phases II and
26. See 21 U.S.C § 355(a); see also Alissa Puckett, Comment, The Proper Focus
for FDA Regulations: Why the Fundamental Right to Self-Preservation Should Allow
Terminally III Patients with No Treatment Options to Attempt to Save Their Lives, 60
SMU L. REV. 635, 642 (2007) (discussing the FDCA's prohibition of market access for
new drugs prior to FDA approval).
27. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 697; see Phases of an Investigation, 21 CF.R.
§ 312.21 (2008) (describing three phases that investigational new drugs undergo prior to
approval by the FDA).
28. Beth E. Meyers, Note, The Food and Drug Administration·s Experimental
Drug Approval System: Is it Good for Your Health?, 28 Hous. L. REV. 309, 313 (1991);
see also 21 U.S.C § 355(b)(1) (outlining evidentiary requirements necessary for filing
an application for a new drug with the FDA); Puckett, supra note 26, at 643 ("[F]our
levels of testing [are] required before new drugs can receive approval to be marketed in
the United States: one on animals and three on humans.").
29. Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, 21 CF.R. § 312 (2008); see Re
quirement for an IND, 21 C.F.R. § 312.20; General Requirements for Use of an Investi
gational New Drug in a Clinical Investigation, 21 CF.R. § 312.40; see also HILTS, supra
note 10, at 168 (noting that the submission of the IND "announce[s] a company's inten
tion to begin human experiments with a new drug"); Meyers, supra note 28, at 313-14
(explaining IND application process); Puckett, supra note 26, at 643 (observing that the
results of animal testing will influence the manufacturer's decision to submit a request
to the FDA for further approval).
30. 21 CF.R. § 312.21.
31. [d.; see also Meyers, supra note 28, at 313-14 (explaining clinical trial and
human testing of experimental drugs); Puckett, supra note 26, at 643 (noting the num
ber of patients usually involved in each stage of the clinical trial process); Johns Hop
kins Kimmel Cancer Center, About Cancer Clinical Trials, http://www.hopkinskimmel
cancercenter.orglindex.cfm/cID/240 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (describing the clinical
trial process and the objectives of the individual phases of the trials).
32. 21 CF.R. § 312.21(a)(1)-(2) provides:
(a) Phase I.
(1) Phase 1 includes the initial introduction of an investigational new
drug into humans. Phase 1 studies are typically closely monitored and may be
conducted in patients or normal volunteer subjects. These studies are designed
to determine the metabolism and pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans,
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III are designed to gather information on the drug's safety and ef

fectiveness for treating a particular disease. 33 Progression through
these phases can be a lengthy process, often taking SIX or more
years to complete. 34
the side effects associated with increasing doses, and, if possible, to gain early
evidence on effectiveness. During Phase 1, sufficient information about the
drug's pharmacokinetics and pharmacological effects should be obtained to
permit the design of well-controlled, scientifically valid, Phase 2 studies. The
total number ofsubjects and patients included in Phase 1 studies varies with the
drug, but is generally in the range of 20 to 80.
(2) Phase 1 studies also include studies of drug metabolism, structure
activity relationships, and mechanism of action in humans, as well as studies in
which investigational drugs are used as research tools to explore biological
phenomena or disease processes.
[d. (emphasis added); see also Foreman, supra note 8 (noting that Phase I of the clinical
trial process is the "safety trial," and a drug in Phase I may only be tested on several
dozen patients).
33. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b)·(c) provides:
(b) Phase 2. Phase 2 includes the controlled clinical studies conducted to
evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication or indications in
patients with the disease or condition under study and to determine the com
mon short-term side effects and risks associated with the drug. Phase 2 studies
are typically well controlled, closely monitored, and conducted in a relatively
small number of patients, usually involving no more than several hundred
subjects.
(c) Phase 3. Phase 3 studies are expanded controlled and uncontrolled
trials. They are performed after preliminary evidence suggesting effectiveness
of the drug has been obtained, and are intended to gather the additional infor
mation about effectiveness and safety that is needed to evaluate the overall bene
fit-risk relationship of the drug and to provide an adequate basis for physician
labeling. Phase 3 studies usually include from several hundred to several thou
sand subjects.
[d. (emphasis added); see also Foreman, supra note 8 (noting that Phases II and III of
the clinical trial process test the effectiveness and potential dosages of experimental
drugs).
34. Elizabeth M. Rutherford, The FDA and "Privatization "-The Drug Approval
Process, 50 FOOD & DRUG LJ. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 203, 213 (1995); see also Geoffrey M.
Levitt, James N. Czaban & Andrea S. Paterson, Human Drug Regulation, in 2 FUNDA
MENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 172 ("The length of FDA review
times on [new drug applications] has been a major source of frustration over the years
for both the agency and the drug industry."); Mary M. Dunbar, Shaking Up the Status
Quo: How AIDS Activists Have Challenged Drug Development and Approval Proce
dures, 46 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 673, 682 (1991) (stating that the approval process for
a new drug "can take six years or longer"); A.W. Harris, Derogating the Precautionary
Principle, 19 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1,71 (2008) ("Perhaps the most prominent example of
the harm caused by excessive 'precaution' in regulatory policy is FDA-induced 'drug
lag.' The FDA must approve new pharmaceuticals and medical devices before they
may be used or prescribed in the United States. The purpose of FDA approval is to
ensure that only those drugs deemed 'safe and effective' are approved for use. In a
precautionary fashion, the FDA seeks to prevent the release of an unsafe drug. Delay
ing the availability of potentially life-saving treatment, however, poses risks of its own.
Consider the question posed by one prominent FDA critic: 'If a drug that has just been
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Following the clinical trial phase of this process, the drug man
ufacturer submits a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA for
approval of the new drug. 35 This application must be approved by
the FDA in order for the manufacturer to market the drug. 36
Under the FDCA, the FDA has 180 days to respond to the applica
tion;37 however, in reality, the approval process can take as long as
thirty months. 38 If the application fails to meet one of the statutory
requirements it will be denied by the FDA.39
2.

Clinical Trials and Early Access

Experimental drugs are not generally available to the public
during the clinical trial process. 40 There are, however, two ways
that a patient can gain access to experimental drugs during the
clinical trial phase. 41 First, if a patient meets the specific requireapproved by FDA will start saving lives tomorrow, then how many people died yester
day waiting for the agency to act?'" (quoting Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry than Safe:
Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the Proposed International Biosafety Proto
col, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 173, 195 (2000))); Brian Christopher Moody, Prescription Medi
cation and Consumer Protection: A Time for Reform, 5 J. PHARMACY & L. 19, 19 (1996)
(estimating that it takes ten to twelve years of development for a drug to reach the
market); Puckett, supra note 26, at 643 ("[C]ompleting all phases of the required
clinical trials takes a minimum of seven years."); Foreman, supra note 8 (estimating that
it can take up to ten years and $800 million, on average, for experimental drugs to gain
approval); Thornton, supra note 2 (noting that clinical testing and FDA approval can
take up to seven years).
35. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,21 U.S.c. § 355(a) (2000);
see also 21 c.F.R. § 314.50 (outlining the requirements that the application must meet
for FDA consideration); HILTS, supra note 10, at 168 ("The NDA is a company's appli
cation for final approval and marketing of a drug after animal and human tests have
been conducted. These applications should contain the most conclusive data proving a
new drug is safe and effective. ").
36. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
37. Id. § 355(c)(1).
38. See Rutherford, supra note 34, at 213 ("The FDA averages thirty months to
review [New Drug Applications], despite the fact that the statutory review limit is six
months."); Stephen R. Kovatis, Note, The Right to Live: Do the Terminally III Have a
Constitutional Right to Use Experimental Drugs?, 26 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVfL. L.
149, 152-53 (2007) (stating that it takes six years to complete the clinical trials and an
average of thirty months for FDA approval following those trials).
39. See 21 U.S.c. § 355(d); see also Foreman, supra note 8 (noting that eighty
percent of experimental drugs will not make it through final FDA approval); Ruther
ford, supra note 34, at 213 ("[O]ne in five compounds ... tested in humans ... receive
FDA approval.").
40. See 21 U.S.c. § 355.
41. Phases of an Investigation, 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2008) (clinical trial process);
Treatment Use of an Investigational New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (treatment IND);
see also Foreman, supra note 8 (noting that a patient can gain access to an experimental
drug by enrolling in a clinical trial or by requesting access from the manufacturer under
a treatment use program).
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ments of the drug manufacturer's clinical trial, she may be able to
receive the drug as a participant in the trial process. 42 Clinical trials
have a limited number of spaces available and gaining access can be
difficult because trials are strictly controlled and, in addition to nu
merous other requirements, mandate that subjects be in certain
stages of a disease. 43
The second means of early access is an FDA exception that
allows patients outside the clinical trial process to access the drug. 44
This exception, known as a "treatment IND," was introduced in
1987. 45 The exception provides access to "drug[s] that [are] not ap
proved for marketing," but are under "clinical investigation."46 The
goal of the exception is to provide potentially lifesaving experimen
tal drugs to needy patients as early as possible. 47
42. 21 c.F.R. § 312.21. However, even enrollment in a clinical trial does not
guarantee that an individual will receive the experimental drug. See Goldberg, supra
note 24, at 23 ("An individual who might benefit from a drug under study might not be
chosen for the clinical trials and, in any event, might receive a placebo in those trials. ");
ClinicaITrials.gov, http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (providing a
searchable database of clinical trials).
43. Meyers, supra note 28, at 310 (noting that locations for clinical trials may be
far from where a willing participant is located); see also Puckett, supra note 26, at 643
("[D)rug companies require a patient to be in a certain stage of the disease, at least
eighteen years of age, and, in some cases, to not have taken certain drugs or treat
ments."); If All Else Fails, supra note 17 (noting that clinical trials "have strict parame
ters.... [and) [o)nly a small percentage of applicants" qualify if they have the same
disease the experimental drug is being tested for).
44. 21 c.F.R. § 312.34. This exception is by no means the only program operated
by the FDA that allows early access to experimental drugs. However, this Note focuses
solely on the treatment IND exception because it is representative of the other FDA
exceptions and because this is the exception that the Abigail Alliance sought to amend
in its Citizen Petition. See Citizen Petition, supra note 19.
45. Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regula
tions; Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,466 (May 22, 1987) (codified at 21
C.F.R. § 312); see also Rita Rubin, Unapproved Drugs Ignite Life-and-Death Debate;
Lawsuit Pits Desperately III Against Hard Bureaucratic Realities, USA TODAY, Apr. 2,
2007, lA (noting that the process of granting access to pre-approved drugs-"compas
sionate use"-has its foundation in successful efforts by AIDS activists in the 1980s).
46. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a). This section provides:
(a) General. A drug that is not approved for marketing may be under
clinical investigation for a serious or immediately life-threatening disease condi
tion in patients for whom no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or
other therapy is available. During the clinical investigation of the drug, it may
be appropriate to use the drug in the treatment of patients not in the clinical
trials, in accordance with a treatment protocol or treatment IND.
Id. (emphasis added).
47. [d.; see also Geoffrey M. Levitt, James N. Czaban & Andrea S. Paterson,
Human Drug Regulation, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note
15, at 199 (noting that the treatment IND exception allows use of experimental drugs
outside a clinical trial to treat patients with qualifying diseases).
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Before access to a drug under a treatment IND is granted, the
patient's physician must first gain the manufacturer's permission to
access the drug. 48 Next, the patient must submit information to the
FDA concerning her clinical history, the proposed treatment plan,
and the supplying manufacturer, as well as statements of informed
consent and investigator qualifications. 49 Access is not automatic
the regulations limit access based on the characteristics of the pa
tient and the drug. 50 A patient with a serious disease, in most situa
tions, can only gain access to experimental drugs that are in Phase
III of the clinical trial process. 51 When the patient has an immedi
ately life-threatening disease,52 he can potentially gain access to ex
perimental drugs during Phase II, but the regulations indicate that
access prior to Phase II ordinarily will not be granted. 53
Additionally, the FDA requires that several criteria be met to
grant access to experimental drugs under a treatment IND.54 First,
48. Physician Request for a Single Patient IND for Compassionate or Emergency
Use, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, http://www.fda.gov/cder/cancerISingleIND.
htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Physician Request for a Single Patient
IND].
49. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.35(b); Physician Request for a Single Patient IND, supra
note 48 (providing requirements and further contact information for obtaining a treat
ment IND).
50. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b).
51. See id. § 312.24(a) ("In the case of a serious disease, a drug ordinarily may be
made available for treatment use under this section during Phase 3 investigations or
after all clinical trials have been completed; however, in appropriate circumstances, a
drug may be made available for treatment use during Phase 2." (emphasis added)). A
"serious disease" is not defined in this section of the code, but the definition can be
inferred to be any disease that does not meet the definition of an "immediately life
threatening disease."
52. Id. § 312.34(b )(3)(ii) ("For the purpose of this section, an 'immediately life
threatening' disease means a stage of a disease in which there is a reasonable likelihood
that death will occur within a matter of months or in which premature death is likely
without early treatment."); see also Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biologi
cal Drug Product Regulations; Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,466, 19,467
(May 22, 1987) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312) (clarifying that the FDA will use a "com
mon sense interpretation" to determine whether there is an "immediate life-threatening
disease").
53. 21 c.F.R. § 312.34(a) ("In the case of an immediately life-threatening disease,
a drug may be made available for treatment use under this section earlier than Phase 3,
but ordinarily not earlier than Phase 2." (emphasis added)). The FDA's refusal to grant
approval for use of drugs in Phase I is likely justified by the fact that Phase I focuses
exclusively on safety, with little attention to effectiveness. See id. § 312.21(a)(I)
(describing Phase I of the clinical trial process). The Alliance's Citizen Petition sought
to allow a treatment IND to be permitted prior to the second phase of the clinical trial
process by removing the phrase "but ordinarily not earlier than Phase 2" from 21
C.F.R. § 312.34(a). See Citizen Petition, supra note 19, at 3.
54. 21 c.F.R. § 312.34(b).
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the requested drug must be intended for the treatment of a "serious
or immediately life-threatening disease."55 Second, the patient
seeking the drug cannot have any other viable treatment options
available. 56 Third, the treatment IND may only request a drug that
is being clinically testedY Finally, the manufacturer of the drug
must be seeking market approval from the FDA for the experimen
tal drug. 58
If these requirements are met, the regulations indicate that the
"FDA shall permit" the treatment use of the experimental drug. 59
However, the FDA can still deny the request for access, even after
successful completion of these prerequisites. 60 If the patient is re
questing the drug to treat a serious disease, the request may be de
nied "for treatment use ... if there is insufficient evidence of safety
and effectiveness to support such use."61 Additionally, for a re
quest based on an "immediately life-threatening disease,"62 the
IND application can also be denied:
[I]f the available scientific evidence, taken as a whole, fails to
provide reasonable basis for concluding that the drug:
(A) May be effective for its intended use in its intended pa
tient population; or
(B) Would not expose the patients to whom the drug is to
be administered to an unreasonable and significant additional
risk of illness or injury.63
Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(i).
!d. § 312.34(b)(1)(ii) ("There is no comparable or satisfactory alternative
drug or other therapy available to treat that stage of the disease in the intended patient
population ....").
57. Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(iii) ("The drug is under investigation in a controlled clinical
trial under an IND in effect for the trial, or all clinical trials have been completed
... .").
58. Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(iv) ("The sponsor of the controlled clinical trial is actively
pursuing marketing approval of the investigational drug with due diligence.").
59. Id. § 312.34(b)(1) (emphasis added).
60. Id. § 312.34(b )(2)-(3).
61. Id. § 312.34(b )(2).
62. Id. § 312.34(b)(3).
63. Id. § 312.34(b)(3)(i)(A)-(B) (emphasis added). This language seems to limit
the treatment exception to only those individuals suffering from the specific disease for
which the drug has undergone clinical testing. Otherwise, it would be difficult to see
how the clinical evidence could provide a "reasonable basis" regarding effectiveness or
exposure to additional risks for a disease on which the drug has not been tested. !d.
The Alliance's Citizen Petition proposed adding the phrase "taking into account the
risk of illness, injury, or death from the disease in the absence of the drug" to 21 C.F.R.
§ 312.34(3)(i)(B), which the Alliance argued would balance the requirements of the
regulation with the individual circumstances of the requesting individual. Citizen Peti
tion, supra note 19, at 4.
55.
56.
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These restrictions to the treatment IND regulation are at the
center of the Alliance's litigation. 64 The Alliance views these re
strictions as ineffective for meeting the needs of terminally ill pa
tients because they "accommodate only a small number of patients"
even when the manufacturer is willing to provide the drug. 65
B.

A Fundamental Right or Not a Fundamental Right-That Is
the Question

The Alliance's complaint sought to enjoin the FDA "from con
tinuing to enforce a policy that violates the constitutional privacy
and liberty rights of terminally ill patients ... and their constitu
tional guarantee against deprivation of life without due process."66
The district court granted the FDA's motion to dismiss the Alli
ance's complaint,67 which led to the two decisions that are the prin
ciple subject of this Note. 68 Before reviewing those decisions, the
following section will provide a brief explanation of the standard
fundamental rights analysis.
1.

Analyzing Fundamental Rights-The Standard of Review

To determine whether terminally ill patients have a fundamen
tal right to access experimental medication, the Abigail Alliance de
cisions relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in Washington v.
Glucksberg. 69 In Glucksberg, the Court followed its standard anal
ysis regarding fundamental rights, which begins with an exploration
64. Complaint, supra note 8, at 1-2.
65. Id. at 6.
66. Id. at 1. The Alliance also included in the complaint a count alleging that the
"FDA's policy of prohibiting the sale of investigational drugs to willing and mentally
competent patients with no other treatment options operates as a death sentence for
those patients" because drug manufacturers are unwilling to provide drugs without
charge. Id. at 10.
67. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No.
03-1601,2004 WL 3777340, at *12 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004), rev'd sub nom. Abigail Alli
ance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C.
Cir. 2006), vacated en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069
(2008).
68. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008); Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v.
von Eschenbach, (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane,
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), eert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
69. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see also Abigail Alliance II,
495 F.3d at 702 (following the analysis set out in Glueksberg); Abigail Alliance I, 445
F.3d at 477 (same).
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of the "Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices."7o Since
substantive due process issues regularly invoke issues outside of the
explicit text of the Constitution, the Court is naturally reluctant to
expand on rights when there is a lack of "guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking."71 History and legal traditions provide the neces
sary "guideposts" to allow courts to make responsible decisions
rather than impose their own policy preferences.7 2 The reliance on
these guideposts is important because protecting an asserted right
on a constitutional basis will, "to a great extent, place the matter
outside the arena of public debate and legislative action."73
70. Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 710; see, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-79
(1990); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion).
71. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115, 125 (1992».
72. [d. (citing Moore, 431 U.S. at 502). In Moore, the Court noted that the Loch
ner era provides ample evidence of the dangers in allowing substantive liberties to ex
pand based on "the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of
[the] Court," instead of looking to the Constitution and Bill of Rights for guidance.
Moore, 431 U.S. at 502. However, the impact that AIDS has had on the dynamic be
tween the need for tighter drug regulations and earlier access to drugs could also be
grounds for an "emerging awareness" argument for access to experimental drugs. See
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003) (noting that the "laws and traditions in
the past half century" are the most relevant indication of history and tradition (empha
sis added». The "emerging awareness" doctrine recognizes that an asserted right may
be fundamental, even without a longstanding history and tradition in this country. Ar
guably, this is due to shifting beliefs over time concerning what rights are fundamental.
This doctrine is in conflict with the normal history and tradition approach to fundamen
tal rights, which examines the nation's entire history and tradition. See Brian Hawkins,
Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence v. Texas,
105 MICH. L. REV. 409, 421 (2006) (noting that the focus on the past half century does
not fit the traditional fundamental rights analysis). The "emerging awareness" ap
proach to analyzing the right in Lawrence is analogous to the right asserted in Abigail
Alliance. Experimental drugs were only recognized following the adoption of the Fed
eral Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), and more notably, the ability to
regulate for safety was first ushered in under that Act. See Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.c. §§ 301-392 (2000». Effectiveness did not become a requirement until the 1962
Drug Amendments, at which point the FDA approached its mandate very rigidly. See
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.c. §§ 301-392); see also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979). Since
that time, the realities of such an inflexible approach to access to drugs have become
increasingly clear. While the FDA still retains control over all experimental drugs, as
well as early access to them, it is evident that access to those drugs can mean the differ
ence between life and death. This "emerging recognition" should be an indication that
preventing access to experimental drugs infringes the due process rights of terminally ill
patients with no other viable treatment option. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
73. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (emphasis added). It is important to note that the
Court has stated that extending constitutional protection only removes the asserted
right from the public discourse "to a great extent"-not entirely. [d. This phrasing
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In addition to searching for history and traditions to serve as
guideposts for the analysis of a fundamental right, a court also looks
to see that there is a "careful description" of the liberty interest that
is being asserted as fundamentaU 4 In Abigail Alliance I, the appel
late panel noted that the Supreme Court has not clearly articulated
how precisely formulated an asserted right should be.75 There is
precedent for identifying fundamental rights at the "most specific
level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection
to, the asserted right can be identified."76 This relatively restrictive
view is mitigated by another view, which holds that "rights not ex
pressed at "'the most specific level" [of generality] available' can
nonetheless be recognized."77
At the conclusion of the fundamental rights analysis, if the
court determines that there is a fundamental liberty interest at
stake, it will subject the infringing statute to strict scrutiny review.7 8
stops short of saying that all public debate ceases when rights are deemed to be funda
mental. Indeed, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), provides an excellent case study for
this proposition. Following more than thirty years and numerous Supreme Court cases,
the issue of abortion has remained a contentious topic that the Court continues to re
visit. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S.
914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S. 833; Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Nancy Hopkins, Editorial, Abortion Rights Linked
to Issue of Greater Equality, THE SUNDAY PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.), Jan. 20, 2008, at
F1 (noting that abortion will playa role in deciding the 2008 presidential election);
Brody Mullins, Campaign '08: Planned Parenthood to Push Candidacies, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 22,2008, at A6A (noting that Planned Parenthood anticipates spending $10 million
to try and persuade one million people to vote for abortion-rights candidates in the
2008 general election).
74. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993);
Collins, 503 U.S. at 125; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277-78).
75. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470, 477 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane, 495
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
76. Id. (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989».
77. Id. at 478 (alteration in original) (quoting Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132
(O'Connor, J., concurring».
78. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. The standard of review that a court applies
in cases involving a fundamental right is generally strict scrutiny. When the legislation
that infringes the fundamental right "comes before the Court," it is afforded "little pre
sumption of constitutionality." MILTON R. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 151 (2001). When the right is deemed to be funda
mental, only a compelling governmental interest can justify its infringement. Id. at 152
53; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 797 (3d
ed. 2006) ("If a right is deemed fundamental, the government must present a compel
ling interest to justify an infringement."). Further, the methods used to achieve the
compelling government interest must be the least restrictive means available, which
means that the infringing legislation must be necessary to achieve that interest.
CHEMERINSKY, supra. A simple showing that a regulation could be achieved in ways
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For the infringing regulation to survive strict scrutiny, the regula
tion must be "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter
est."79 If the asserted right is not classified as fundamental, the
level of review will be rationality review. so Rationality review, a
much lower threshold of examination, requires that the regulation
provide "a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to jus
tify the action."sl It is necessary to have these different standards
of review in mind when considering the Alliance I and Alliance II
decisions.

2.

Abigail Alliance I: Early Access as a Fundamental Right

When the Alliance appealed the district court opinion, a di
vided appellate panel reversed, finding that "a terminally ill, men
tally competent adult patient's informed access to potentially life
saving investigational new drugs ... warrants protection under the
Due Process Clause."s2 The court's inquiry concerned whether ter
minally ill patients who are mentally competent have a right to ob
that would be less of an infringement will be sufficient to find the regulation unconstitu
tional under strict scrutiny review. See id. Once strict scrutiny is applied, the burden of
establishing that the infringing government action is the least restrictive alternative to
meet a compelling interest is a high hurdle that the government is unlikely to meet.
79. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Reno, 507 U.S. at 302); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 78, at 797 (noting the need
for "a compelling interest to justify an infringement" of a fundamental right).
80. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722. Conversely, if the right is not determined to be
fundamental, a court will apply rationality review, which assumes judicial deference "to
the legislative judgment" concerning the regulation. KONVITZ, supra note 78, at 150-51;
see also Roger Pilon, The New Right to Life, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2007, at All (char
acterizing the rational basis test as a "judicial abdication" by allowing the government
to regulate "as long as it had any reason for restricting access"). Under this deferential
standard, the infringing government action must only "be a reasonable way to achieve
the goal," and not the least restrictive means of achieving it. CHEMERINSKY, supra note
78, at 797. Further, instead of requiring a compelling government interest, only a legiti
mate government interest is required. If the right asserted is not defined as fundamen
tal by the court, such as the right in Abigail Alliance II, the plaintiff must "prove that
the government's restrictions bear no rational relationship to a legitimate state inter
est." Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach
(Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 1069 (2008). The Abigail Alliance J/ court noted that "[t]he challenged policy 'need
not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.'" [d. (quoting William
son v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)).
81. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
82. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding 2-1 in favor
of a fundamental right of access to experimental drugs by the terminally ill), vacated en
bane, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
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tain "potentially life-saving post-Phase I investigational new drugs,"
even if the drugs carry risks for the patient. 83
The appeals court applied the fundamental rights analysis of
Washington v. Glucksberg 84 and concluded that the ability of an in
dividual to access drugs had not been impaired "throughout the
greater part of our Nation's history."85 The court indicated that the
right asserted by the Alliance could be inferred from the Supreme
Court's holding in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,86 which suggests that liberty provides an individual with a
"due process right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment."87
The court provided further justification for its ruling by grounding
its analysis in the historical foundation of the common law, which
"included the right to self-defense and the right to self-preserva
83. Id. at 472. The court also recognized that terminally ill patients are not acting
on their own, but are in consultation with their doctors concerning the potential bene
fits and hazards that could result from the experimental drugs. Id.
84. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 703 ("The Court's established method of substantive
due-process analysis has two primary features: First, the Court has regularly observed
that the Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, ob
jectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. Second, the Court has
required a 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." (citations
omitted».
85. Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d at 472.
86. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The petitioners in
Cruzan were seeking the right to have their daughter removed from artificial nutrition
and hydration, which would cause her death. Id. at 266-68. Their daughter was perma
nently incapacitated and in a persistent vegetative state following a car accident. /d.
The Court, in examining "whether Cruzan has a right under the ... Constitution which
would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment," concluded that a
state could "require[] ... evidence of the incompetent's wishes as to the withdrawal of
treatment." Id. at 269, 280. The individual has the right to refuse medical treatment,
but the state has a strong "interest in the protection and preservation of human life,"
which allowed it to require an evidentiary showing of the incompetent patient's wishes
that treatment be withdrawn. Id. at 280.
87. Id. According to the court of appeals, the right asserted by the Alliance was a
naturally inferred proposition based on the right in Cruzan:
[T]he Supreme Court in Cruzan recognized, in light of the common law and
constitutionally protected liberty interests based on the inviolability of one's
body, that an individual has a due process right to make an informed decision
to engage in conduct, by withdrawing treatment, that will cause one's death.
The logical corollary is that an individual must also be free to decide for her
self whether to assume any known or unknown risks of taking a medication
that might prolong her life.
Like the right claimed in Cruzan, the right claimed by the Alliance to be
free of FDA imposition does not involve treatment by the government or a
government subsidy. Rather, much as the guardians of the comatose patient
in Cruzan did, the Alliance seeks to have the government step aside by chang
ing its policy so the individual right of self-determination is not violated.
Id. at 484 (footnotes omitted).

2009]

THE GOOD OF THE FEW

551

tion."88 The court noted that under the common law, there is no
general duty to rescue or preserve life, yet interfering with these
efforts can create liability.89 The court looked at these common law
doctrines as evidence of a historical basis for the right to self
preserva tion.
The court then turned to the history of drug regulation in the
United States, conduding that, for the most part, the country
lacked drug regulations prior to 1906. 90 Additionally, the court
found that, prior to 1962, there were no regulations that required
drug manufacturers to provide evidence of a drug's effectiveness. 91
The court also focused on the omission of FDA regulations con
cerning several "aspects of patient access to drugs," referring specif
ically to the absence of regulations directed at physicians. 92
Physicians are able to prescribe drugs "off-label," which means a
physician can prescribe "a drug to a patient for a purpose other
than that for which the FDA has approved the use of the drug."93
According to the court, permitting physicians to prescribe drugs to
treat diseases other than those for which they have been approved
undermines the FDA's insistence on the necessity of FDA approval
of the drugs' safety and effectiveness prior to their availability.94
Essentially, the court found little distinction between a physician
prescribing a drug to treat a disease for which the drug has not been
found to be effective and prescribing an experimental drug.
88. Abigail Alliance 1, 445 F.3d at 480.
89. 1d. The court viewed the effect of the FDA's regulations as creating this type
of liability. Specifically, the court stated that "[bJarring a terminally ill patient from the
use of a potentially life-saving treatment impinges on th[e] right of self-preservation."
1d.
90. 1d. at 481. The court was referring to the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906,
which introduced, for the first time, regulations pertaining to drugs. See Pure Food and
Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938); infra Part I.e.l for
information regarding the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906.
91. Abigail Alliance 1, 445 F.3d at 482. There were, however, regulations requir
ing evidence of safety. 1d. In 1938, the FDCA was passed, which required that new
drugs be proven safe for their intended use. In 1962, this Act was amended to require
that new drugs also be proven effective for their intended use. See infra Part I.e.2-3 for
further discussion on the FDCA and the 1962 Amendments.
92. Abigail Alliance 1, 445 F.3d at 483. See generally Salbu, supra note 15 (pro
viding an in-depth explanation of off-label use); Katherine A. Helm, Note, Protecting
Public Health from Outside the Physician's Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from
Drug Safety Labeling to Off-Label Drug Promotion, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. ME·
DIA & ENT. LJ. 117, 152-54 (2008) (defining off-label use).
93. Abigail Alliance 1, 445 F.3d at 483; see Salbu, supra note 15, at 186-88.
94. See Abigail Alliance 1, 445 F.3d at 483.
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The court's final point was based on its perception "that an
individual must ... be free to decide for herself whether to assume
any known or unknown risks of taking a medication that might pro
long her life. "95 The court stated: "If there is a protected liberty
interest in self-determination that includes a right to refuse life-sus
taining treatment, even though this will hasten death, then the same
liberty interest must include the complementary right of access to
potentially life-sustaining medication, in light of the explicit protec
tion accorded 'life."'96 Clearly, then, the court viewed the right of
access to experimental drugs as fundamental, and it remanded the
case to the district court to determine whether the FDA's regula
tion violated this protected liberty interest. 97

3.

Abigail Alliance II: Early Access Is Not a Fundamental
Right

Rehearing was granted en banc and the full appellate court va
cated the decision in Abigail Alliance 1,98 reaffirming the original
holding of the district court. 99 The en banc court viewed the ques
tion presented by the Alliance as "whether the Constitution pro
vides terminally ill patients a right to access to experimental drugs
that have passed limited safety trials but have not been proven safe
and effective."lOo The en banc court concluded that there is no fun

Id. at 484.
Id. at 484-85. The court viewed this as "[t]he logical corollary" to the Su
preme Court's determination in Cruzan "that an individual has a due process right to
make an informed decision to engage in conduct, by withdrawing treatment that will
cause one's death." Id. at 484.
97. Id. at 486.
98. Id. at 470.
99. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance lJ), 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en bane), cert. de
nied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). The district court determined in Abigail Alliance for Better
Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan that the Alliance's argument did not
demonstrate a right that had "a longstanding tradition." Accordingly, it held there was
no fundamental right at issue. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental
Drugs v. McClellan, No. 03-1601, 2004 WL 3777340, at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004),
rev'd sub nom. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). Again, the court was divided, with the two judges
from the earlier decision maintaining that the right asserted was fundamental, and the
remaining eight judges holding that the right asserted was not fundamental. See Pol
lack, supra note 12 (recounting the decision to vacate the original appeals court ruling).
100. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 697. As noted, the issue was initially framed
by the panel decision as "whether the Due Process Clause protects the right of termi
nally ill patients to make informed decisions that may prolong life." Abigail Alliance I,
95.
96.
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damental right guaranteeing access to experimental drugs that is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."lOl
The court began its analysis by reviewing the history and legal
traditions related to drug regulation. 102 In response to the Alli
ance's assertion that efficacy of drugs was not regulated prior to
1962,103 the court concluded that the Alliance failed to contemplate
the regulation of drug safety.1 04 The regulations challenged by the
Alliance prevented access to experimental drugs because they have
not been proven effective or safe .105 As a result, the en banc court
required the Alliance to show a tradition of access to drugs that
have not had their safety or effectiveness established by the
FDA.I06 In concluding that such a tradition did not exist, the court
445 F.3d at 477; see also Pollack, supra note 12 (observing the change in the characteri
zation of the right asserted by the Alliance).
101. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 697 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997».
102. Id. at 703.
103. Id.
104. [d. at 703-07. The court concluded that "[d]rug regulation in the United
States began with the Colonies and States," and provided an overview of relevant legis
lation to support this premise. Id. at 704-05. The court first pointed to legislation
passed by the Colony of Virginia in 1736 regarding pharmacy as evidence of a long
standing tradition of drug regulation. [d. at 705. However, this legislation was "for
regulation of the fees and accounts of the practitioners of physic," and its primary pur
pose had "no direct relation to the pharmacy laws of today." EDWARD KREMERS,
GEORGE URDANG & GLENN SONNEDECKER, KREMERS AND URDANG'S HISTORY OF
PHARMACY 158 (4th ed. 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). In essence, this leg
islation was designed by highly trained physicians as a means of establishing a tier sys
tem of rates that could be charged by individuals based upon their training. !d. at 158
59. Those practitioners who attended a university were permitted to charge roughly
double the price for their services in dispensing drugs as individuals who were merely
apprentices of surgeons or apothecaries. [d. at 158. The legislation noted that such
apprentices were "very unskillful" and "demand excessive [f]ees," but mentions nothing
regarding the safety or efficacy of drugs administered by "apprentices." [d. The legisla
tion only stated that the practice of administering drugs in "greater [q]uantities ... than
are necessary or useful" is "dangerous and intolerable." [d. While there can be no
doubt that such practices are particularly troublesome, the statute itself did not address
drug safety or efficacy, and only targeted the individuals administering medications. Id.
at 158-59. This suggests that the law was more of a response to interest groups seeking
to force their competition out of business. [d. Regardless, these laws fall short of mak
ing any requirement that drugs must meet specific standards of safety and effectiveness,
nor do they lend support for the en banc court's conclusions.
105. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 703.
106. [d. The court's focus on safety and effectiveness in this case fails to consider
the population on whose behalf the Alliance is advocating. The requirement that drugs
be safe and effective serves general public safety concerns, but these concerns are not
present within the specific population of terminally ill patients. These patients, whom
FDA regulations define as near death, often have nothing to gain from assurances of
safety and efficacy. Terminal patients with no other viable treatment options are less
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found "that our Nation has long expressed interest in drug regula
tion, calibrating its response in terms of the capabilities to deter
mine the risks associated with both drug safety and efficacy."lo7
The court then examined the common law doctrines that the
Alliance argued in support of its claim of a fundamental right of
access to experimental drugs for the terminally il1. 108 The en banc
court ruled that: "the doctrine of necessity; ... the tort of inten
tional interference with rescue; and ... the right to self-defense"109
did not support the Alliance's argument. 110 The court summarized
its reasons as follows:
[W]e conclude that the Alliance has not provided evidence of a
right to procure and use experimental drugs that is deeply rooted
in our Nation's history and traditions. To the contrary, our Na
tion's history evidences increasing regulation of drugs as both the
ability of government to address these risks has increased and the
risks associated with drugs have become apparent. Similarly, our
legal traditions of allowing a necessity defense, prohibiting inten
tional interference with rescue, and recognizing a right of self
defense cannot justify creating a constitutional right to assume
any level of risk without regard to the scientific and medical judg
ment expressed through the clinical testing process. II I

Since the court found that the Alliance's argument failed to
establish the existence of a fundamental right, it applied rational
basis scrutiny to the Alliance's claim.1 12 Examining the regulations
under this level of review, the court in Abigail Alliance II had little
trouble determining that limiting access to experimental drugs
serves a legitimate state interest. H3
concerned with the safety or effectiveness of experimental drugs because the alternative
is death.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 707-10.
109. Id. at 707.
110. Id. at 707-10.
111. Id. at 711.
112. Id. at 712. Rational basis scrutiny is the lowest level of judicial review that
courts will apply in due process cases. This test is applied when the plaintiff is asserting
a right that is not fundamental under the Constitution. Government regulation of such
a right is permissible so long as there is a legitimate interest for the government's regu
lation. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 78, at 797.
113. Abigail Alliance /I, 495 F.3d at 712 ("[T]he FDA's policy of limiting access to
investigational drugs is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting
patients, including the terminally ill, from potentially unsafe drugs with unknown thera
peutic effects.").
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The History and Tradition of Safety and Efficacy in Federal
Drug Regulations

The en banc decision placed great emphasis on a lack of history
and tradition for unfettered access to experimental drugS. 114 How
ever, the court deftly avoided a thorough discussion of the major
federal legislation.1 15 The history of federal drug regulation dem
onstrates gradual progression toward increased drug testing to en
sure that drugs are not harmful. Each step toward tighter controls
followed an event that caused public outcry and placed pressure on
Congress to limit access to drugs that had not been vetted in a test
ing process.1 16 The tightest controls were finally achieved in 1962
with the Kefauver-Harris Amendments (Drug Amendments of
1962).11 7 Yet, since then, they have faced opposition because the
controls block access to certain drugs. In 1988, the FDA amended
the regulations to allow some access to the terminally ill to experi
mental drugs before they were fully approved. 118
1.

Labeling Concerns and the Pure Food and Drugs Act of
1906

Although the first federallegislation 119-enacted in 1848-was
designed to provide some general regulation of drugs, the Pure
Food and Drugs Act of 1906120 is viewed as the initial step toward
the tightening of federal control of drugS. 121 Legislation addressing
[d. at 703·11.
Id.
See PETER TEMIN, Taking Your Medicine: Drug Regulation in the United
States 29 (1980).
117. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified at 21
U.S.c. §§ 301-392 (2000)).
118. See infra Part LC.4.
119. The earliest federal drug law of note was the Import Drug Act of 1848,
which regulated the importation of drugs into the country, a topic outside the scope of
this discussion. See Import Drug Act of 1848, 9 Stat. 237; Wesley J. Heath, America's
First Drug Regulation Regime: The Rise and Fall of the Import Drug Act of 1848, 59
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 169 (2004); Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of u.s. Drug
Regulation and Labeling, 36 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 420 (1981) (providing a general
historical timeline of the FDA and pertinent legislation).
120. Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384,34 Stat. 768 (repealed
1938).
121. See Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Procedures of the Food and Drug Ad
ministration, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 14-17
(noting that the Pure Food and Drugs Act was inherently "a law enforcement statute"
as opposed to a regulatory one); Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments,
60 GEO. L.J. 185, 185 (1971) [hereinafter Note, Drug Efficacy] (citing the Pure Food
and Drugs Act as the first regulation of a "national scope" directed at drugs).
114.
115.
116.
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the purity of food had been submitted to Congress "throughout the
1890s and early 1900s" with each attempt at regulation failing to
gain approval.1 22 It was not until 1906, with the publication of
Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, that "[p]ublic outrage" reached the
ears and votes of Congress. 123
Operating under its Commerce Clause power, the Fifty-Ninth
Congress passed legislation that penalized the "misbranding and
adulteration" of drugs. 124 The Act defines "adulterated" as
whether, at the time of sale, a drug "differs from the standard of
strength, quality, or purity" as certified under testing.1 25 "Mis
branded" refers to "all drugs, ... the package or label of which shall
bear any statement, design, or device regarding such article, or the
ingredients or substances contained therein which shall be false or
misleading in any particular, and to any food or drug product which
is falsely branded .... "126 Specifically, drugs were considered mis
branded when they were advertised to be something they were not,
or when the label was either inaccurate or had omitted statements
regarding certain included contents. 127
122. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 28.
123. Id. at 28-29; see also KREMERS, URDANG & SONNEDECKER, SUPRA note 104,
at 220 (noting that Upton Sinclair's The Jungle helped to push public opinion in favor of
federal regulation); UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906); HARVEY W. WILEY, THE
HISTORY OF A CRIME AGAINST THE FOOD LAW 266 (Arno Press 1976) (1929) (" 'The
Jungle,' brought public opinion to the pitch of indignant excitement."); JAMES HARVEY
YOUNG, THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF PATENT MEDICINE IN
AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION 239 (1961) ("The Jungle . .. described the
filthy conditions under which America's meat was processed, ... how rats and the
poisoned bread put out to catch them were ground up with meat for public consump
tion, [and] how employees now and then slipped into steamy vats and next went forth
into the world as Durham's Pure Leaf Lard."). See generally SINCLAIR, supra.
124. KREMERS, URDANG & SONNEDECKER, supra note 104, at 220 (emphasis
added); see also Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 1, 34 Stat. 768,
768 (repealed 1938) ("[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture ... any ...
drug which is adulterated or misbranded.").
125. Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 § 7 (At most, the requirement that a drug
not exceed the accepted standard of "strength, quality, or purity" at the time of sale is
the only indication under this act that suggests that the drafters were concerned with
the safety of drugs.).
126. Id. § 8.
127. Section 8 of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 states:
First. If it be an imitation of or offered for sale under the name of an
other article.
Second. If the contents of the package as originally put up shall have
been removed, in whole or in part, and other contents shall have been placed
in such package, or if the package fail to bear a statement on the label of the
quantity or proportion of any alcohol, morphine, opium, cocaine, heroin, al
pha or beta eucaine, chloroform, cannabis indica, chloral hydrate, or acetani
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These portions of the Pure Food and Drugs Act demonstrate
that the Act itself was not designed to promote safety and efficacy
of drugs; under the plain meaning of the statute, it was meant "to
assure the customer of the identity of the article purchased, not of
[the drug's] usefulness."128 The law did not prevent the individual
consumer from self-medicating either, but it did seek to make self
medication safer by requiring drug manufacturers to be truthful
about a drug's contents. 129 Despite its shortcomings, the 1906 law
set the foundation for future drug regulation. 130
2.

Drug Safety and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act of 1938

The deaths of over one hundred people due to the toxic effects
of "Elixir Sulfanilamide"131 led directly to the introduction of the
legislation that is currently in force today.1 32 The FDCA took steps
to overcome the problems of the 1906 law and give the federal go v
lide, or any derivative or preparation of any such substances contained
therein.
[d.

128. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 33; see also HILTS, supra note 10, at 68 ("The 1906
law was built on the idea that false claims must be prosecuted, rather than addressing
the real issues of whether ... drugs put on the market were safe and worked as they
claimed."); Helm, supra note 92, at 126 ("The 1906 Act served its somewhat 'laissez
faire' purpose of at least putting the public on notice about the contents of commer
cially available drug products. It did not, however, address either the safety or efficacy
of the drug products, other than in the context of false or misleading claims of therapeu
tic effect.").
129. YOUNG, supra note 123, at 244; see also TEMIN, supra note 116, at 22-23
(noting that patients in the late nineteenth century did not need a prescription to obtain
a drug, and "[a]ny drug that could be obtained with a prescription could also be ob
tained without one"). Early regulations were not concerned with drugs, but with licens
ing of individuals dispensing drugs. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 22-23. "[M]edical
licensing laws prohibited nondoctors from 'practising [sic] medicine,'" but they had no
effect on the access to drugs by the general public. [d. at 23. "Patients did not need to
go to a doctor to get a drug; nor were they bound by the doctor's selection if they did."
[d. Members of the public were free to choose-among the various drugs available
which ones they wanted to take. [d.
130. KREMERS, URDANG & SONNEDECKER, supra note 104, at 221.
131. [d.; see also TEMIN, supra note 116, at 42-43 (recounting the "Elixir Sulfanil
amide disaster" and the impact it had on the passage of the FDCA); Janssen, supra note
119, at 429 (noting that Elixir Sulfanilamide, a "poisonous solvent," killed over one
hundred people). Elixir sulfanilamide was a sulfur drug designed to "treat strep throat
and other infections" that also contained a highly toxic substance that was called
diethylene glycol. Stephen Mihm, A Tragic Lesson, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26, 2007, at
3.

132. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 43.
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ernment more control over drugs in general. 133 The new Act made
several important changes that were relevant to the claims of the
Abigail Alliance.134 Section 505 of the FDCA created, in effect, a
class system of drugs by requiring an application for any new drug
prior to public distribution. 135 To gain market access under the
Act, the manufacturer now needed to produce evidence demon
strating that the drug was safe for use. 136 New drugs are "[a]ny
133. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat.
1040 (codified as amended at 21 u.s.c. §§ 301-392 (2000»; see also H.R. REP. No. 74
2755, at 3 (1936) ("The measure contains substantially all the features of the old law
that have proved valuable in promoting honesty and fair dealing. But it amplifies and
strengthens the provisions designed to safeguard the public health and prevent decep
tion ... and it strengthens the procedural provisions to make more certain the accom
plishment of its purpose."); TEMIN, supra note 116, at 42-46 (noting the increased
requirements of the regulation over its predecessor, the Pure Food and Drugs Act of
1906); Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Procedures of the Food and Drug Administra
tion, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 19 (noting that
the Act moved beyond a police function into "direct regulation of the industries within
its jurisdiction").
134. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance 1), 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane, 495 F.3d
695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
135. See H.R. REP. No. 75-2139, at 3 (1938) ("A definition of the term 'new drug'
is provided for the purpose of applying section 505, a provision intended to require
adequate testing of new drugs to determine their safety before they are placed on the
market."); TEMIN, supra note 116, at 44. This new class of drug is an "experimental
drug," which required evidence of safety prior to approval. Previously, a manufacturer
could immediately market the drug. Once the FDA approved the manufacturer's new
drug application, the "experimental" classification of the drug was removed.
136. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505:
(a) No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate
commerce any new drug, unless an application filed pursuant to subsection (b)
is effective with respect to such drug.
(b) Any person may file with the Secretary an application with respect to
any drug subject to the provisions of subsection (a). Such person shall submit
to the Secretary as a part of the application (1) full reports of investigations
which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use ....
[d. (emphasis added). Additionally, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com
merce reported that:
Section 505 (a) requires new drugs to be adequately tested before they
are commercialized. In order to insure that the tests made have been com
plete, the introduction of a new drug in interstate commerce is prohibited un
less the manufacturer has submitted full information showing that the drug has
been adequately tested and has not been found to be unsafe for use under the
conditions prescribed in the labeling. This is not a license provision, but is
intended merely to prevent the premature marketing of new drugs not prop
erly tested for safety....
. . . The provision merely sets up a method for the authoritative review of
the manufacturer's tests and will not unreasonably delay the introduction of
new drugs in the market.
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drug the composition of which is such that such drug is not gener
ally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate the safety of drugs, as safe for use under the
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling
thereof .... "137 The 1938 Act imposed safety requirements for the
first time but did not address issues of efficacy.
This new law also represented a change in policyP8 Under the
1906 Act, consumers were allowed to make their own decisions re
garding drugs so long as they had information that correctly de
scribed the drug's composition. 139 The new law required, in
addition to making sure the drug was "safe," that drug manufactur
ers provide instructions for using the drug.14° Although the regula
tions restricted what drugs made it to the market, the overall
"choice of drugs" was still left to the individual consumer, albeit
with new efforts geared toward safety.1 41
3.

Drug Effectiveness, the 1962 Drug Amendments, and a
Challenge to the "New" Status Quo

The FDCA was given sharper teeth in the early 1960s following
three years of congressional investigations.1 42 Initially, these inves
tigations focused on problems with testing, marketing, and drug
costs, but they culminated at the same time as another drug-related
catastrophe. 143 Late in 1961, an outbreak of phocomelia, a birth
defect that causes deformed hands and feet, was reported "with
H.R. REP. No. 75-2139, at 9 (emphasis added). This statute was the predecessor of
what eventually became the IND application. See Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Pro
cedures of the Food and Drug Administration, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGU·
LATION, supra note 15, at 23 (classifying Section 505 as a means for the FDA to assert
administrative review over the safety tests of a manufacturer).
137. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(p)(I) (emphasis added); see
also ESTES KEFAUVER, IN A FEW HANDS: MONOPOLY POWER IN AMERICA 78 (1965)
("The 1938 food and drug law required merely that new drugs, to be cleared for mar
keting, be proved safe."); Janssen, supra note 119, at 429 ("Drug manufacturers were
required to provide scientific proof that new products could be safely used before put
ting them on the market ....").
138. See TEMIN, supra note 116, at 45; Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Proce
dures of the Food and Drug Administration, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGU·
LATION, supra note 15, at 19 (shifting from a policing function to a regulatory function).
139. See Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 769 (codi
fied at 21 U.S.c. § 1-15 (2000)) (repealed 1938); TEMIN, supra note 116, at 45.
140. See TEMIN, supra note 116, at 45; Helm, supra note 92, at 127.
141. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 45.
142. KEFAUVER, supra note 137, at 77-78.
143. [d. at 77; see also KREMERS, URDANG & SONNEDECKER, supra note 104, at
222 (noting that thalidomide was the cause of birth defects); TEMIN, supra note 116, at
123 (discussing thalidomide in Europe); Helm, supra note 92, at 128.
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alarming frequency in Germany and other European countries."144
The source of the outbreak was identified as thalidomide, a popular
sleep-aid in Europe that was "widely prescribed off-label to preg
nant women" to ease morning sickness. 145 Thalidomide was await
ing approval by the FDA when it was identified as the source of the
phocomelia outbreak in Europe. 146
Following the thalidomide disaster, the 1962 amendments in
creased the FDCA's drug safety requirements by adding an addi
tional hurdle requiring manufacturers to demonstrate that a drug is
effective for a specific purpose.1 47 Additionally, the amendment to
the 1938 Act altered the definition of "new drug" to "[a]ny drug the
composition of which is such that such drug is not generally recog
nized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience
to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effec
tive for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or sug
gested in the labeling thereof ...."148
The 1962 amendments substantially changed the process that
drugs undergo before reaching the public. The FDA became ac
tively involved in the approval process and was required to approve
new drugs affirmatively before they entered the market. 149 The
FDA also pre-approved the testing process employed by manufac
turers to demonstrate safety and effectiveness.1 5o Moreover, the
Drug Amendments of 1962 initiated a revamped verSIOn of the
144. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 123; see also KREMERS, URDANG & SON
NEDECKER, supra note 104, at 222 (noting that thalidomide "was undergoing wide
spread and not too tightly controlled clinical trials in the United States").
145. Helm, supra note 92, at 128-29.
146. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 123; see also Helm, supra note 92, at 128 (noting
that thalidomide was responsible for birth defects across Europe).
147. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.c. §§ 301-392 (2000»; KEFAUVER, supra note 137, at 78 ("[D]rugs
must be proved efficacious for the conditions for which they are recommended."); see
also HENRY G. GRABOWSKI, DRUG REGULATION AND INNOVATION: EMPIRICAL EVI
DENCE AND POLICY OPTIONS 15 (1976) (The 1962 Drug Amendments "required firms
to provide documented scientific evidence on a new drug's efficacy in addition to the
proof of safety required by the 1938 act."). The new requirements of the 1962 amend
ment also had an impact on the availability of drugs because of the heightened require
ment of demonstrating that the drug was effective for treating specific illnesses.
OAKLEY RAY & CHARLES KSIR, DRUGS, SOCIETY, AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 63 (Mc
Graw-Hill Companies, Inc., 8th ed. 1999) (1972); see also Janssen, supra note 119, at 438
(noting that after the 1962 amendments, safety and effectiveness must be shown with
substantial evidence).
148. See Drug Amendments of 1962 § 102(a).
149. TEMIN, supra note 116, at 125.
150. Id.
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"New Drug Application," first established under the 1938 Act, but
now with higher standards for safety and effectiveness. lSI
The new amendments were not welcomed by everyone and
spawned litigation regarding access to drugs that failed to meet the
new requirements of safety and effectiveness. lS2 In United States v.
Rutherford,lS3 a case strikingly similar to the Abigail Alliance cases,
the Supreme Court addressed whether the new safety and effective
ness requirements of the FDCA applied to the use of unapproved
drugs by terminally ill cancer patients. 1s4 A group of patients initi
ated the action to enjoin the FDA from removing the cancer drug
Laetrile from the market. lss Laetrile had been redefined as a new
drug after the 1962 amendments took effect, and the absence of
"scientific studies of Laetrile's safety or effectiveness" precluded
FDA approva1. 1S6 The Court concluded that terminally ill cancer
patients were not a class exempt from the statute's requirements,
and, therefore, they had no right to access drugs that did not meet
the new FDCA requirements of safety and effectiveness. 1s7 The
Court refused to "accept the proposition that the safety and efficacy
151. Drug Amendments of 1962 §§ 102-104. The "New Drug Application" pro
cess, in its current form, is briefly outlined in Part LA.1.
152. See Puckett, supra note 26, at 645-50 (reviewing other litigation that has
challenged the FDA's new drug approval process).
153. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979). Rutherford provides fur
ther support for the Abigail Alliance [ decision by noting that the FDCA of 1938 first
established safety requirements for new drugs and the 1962 Drug Amendments added
effectiveness as a prerequisite to new drug approval. [d. at 552. The Supreme Court's
assertion on this point directly contradicts the claim in Abigail Alliance II that "at least
some drug regulation prior to 1962 addressed efficacy." Abigail Alliance for Better
Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach (Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695,
706 (D.C. CiT. 2007) (en bane), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
154. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 546; see also FRED H. DEGNAN, FDA's CREATIVE
ApPLICATION OF THE LAW: NOT MERELY A COLLECfION OF WORDS 74-78 (2000) (re
counting the litigation involving Laetrile and the FDA). While the Court in Rutherford
was not addressing whether a terminally ill patient had a fundamental right to access
experimental medication, the decision set the stage for the Abigail Alliance litigation.
If the "safety and effectiveness" requirements of the FDCA apply to all persons, not
just those with curable diseases, it seems that this precedent would only allow termi
nally ill patients to access experimental drugs through a due process right.
155. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 548.
156. [d. at 549-50.
157. [d. at 554; see also Helm, supra note 92, at 132 (noting that the Court in
Rutherford viewed the 1962 amendments as mandating the FDA to prevent market
access to drugs whose therapeutic benefit did not outweigh their potential danger); An
drew Bridges, Dying Patients' Lawsuit Will Go On: They Want Access to Experimental
Drugs that Won't Be FDA-Approved in Time to Help Them, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
May 3, 2006, at A7 (noting that the Rutherford Court ruled that there was no exemp
tion in the safety and effectiveness standards of the FDCA for terminally ill patients).
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standards of the [FDCA had] no relevance for terminal patients"
because it would "deny the [FDA] Commissioner's authority over
all drugs" for the terminally il1. 158 This claim would be addressed
anew when the FDA decided to relax the strict preclusion of access
prior to its approval of a new drug. 159
4.

FDA Rulemaking-Early Access Through the Treatment
IND Regulations of 1988

While the chemically induced catastrophes of the early- and
mid-twentieth century led to tighter drug regulations,16o the health
epidemics of the late-twentieth century demonstrated the need for
greater flexibility. Diseases such as AIDS caused a shift of focus
from the safety and efficacy of drugs to the preservation of life,
despite the risks of potentially harmful side effects of unproven
medications. 161
In response to a call for earlier access to promising drugs, the
FDA adopted regulations for the treatment use of new drugs under
going clinical testing.1 62 In contrast to the holding in United States
v. Rutherford, which affirmed the FDA's strict approach to safety
and effectiveness requirements for all drugs, the new regulations
158. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 557. The Court provided additional support for this
proposition, arguing that "to exempt from the Act drugs with no proved effectiveness
... 'would lead to needless deaths and suffering among ... patients characterized as
"terminal" who could actually be helped by legitimate therapy.'" Id. (quoting Lae
trile-Commissioner's Decision, 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768, 39,805 (Aug. 5, 1977)). While it is
arguable that this case would be a hindrance to the Alliance's argument, it is important
to remember that the Alliance is seeking access to experimental drugs for those termi
nally ill patients with no other viable treatment option only, and not access that would
allow the terminally ill to choose between experimental and generally accepted treat
ments. See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 70l.
159. See Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Reg
ulations; Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,466, 19,473 (May 22, 1987) (codified
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 131-133, 143-146.
161. Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA
New Drug Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'y 295, 295-96 (2000); see
also Geoffrey M. Levitt, James N. Czaban & Andrea S. Paterson, Human Drug Regula
tion, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 172 (noting that
complaints about drug approval delays from many groups, including AIDS patients,
prompted initiatives designed to get drugs to qualifying patients sooner); Goldberg,
supra note 24, at 26 ("Spurred in part by the AIDS epidemic, faster access to new drugs
has been an increasingly popular position for decades.").
162. Treatment Use of an Investigational New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 312.34 (2008);
see also supra notes 40-65 and accompanying text.
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took a more lenient approach.163 The FDA acknowledged a need
for "separate standard[ s] for drugs intended to treat immediately
life-threatening diseases" based on "the different risk-benefit con
siderations involved in treating such diseases."l64 This shift arises
from balancing the risks of death from terminal illnesses, such as
AIDS, against the goals of the regulations. 165 Early access regula
tions now provide an avenue for qualified individuals to gain early
access to experimental drugS. 166

II.

Is ACCESS TO EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS
A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?

Whether or not the Constitution safeguards proposed rights
that are not specifically enumerated is a contentious topic infused
with passion and logic. 167 The answer, unequivocally under Su
163. The logic rejected in United States v. Rutherford, "that the safety and efficacy
standards of the Act have no relevance for terminal patients," is consistent with the
treatment exception. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 557-58. In the final issued rule, the FDA
argued that the treatment exception fits within the holding of the Rutherford decision.
However, the greater focus on "risk balancing" supports a policy shift by the FDA away
from strict interpretation of the new drug requirements to a more flexible approach.
See Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations;
Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. at 19,473 (noting that the new regulations would
not conflict with Rutherford); DEGNAN, supra note 154, at 79 (The treatment IND is
"fundamentally at odds with the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Rutherford
in that the new drug approval requirements of the Act apply equally to all drugs, in
cluding drugs intended for treating terminal diseases.").
164. Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regula
tions; Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed. Reg. at 19,468 (rationalizing the intent of the
Treatment IND regUlation). But see Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 549-50 ("The [FDCA]
makes no special provision for drugs used to treat terminally ill patients."); Helm, supra
note 92, at 133 (clarifying the holding in Rutherford as preventing the FDA from "side
step[ping] its own regulations for terminally ill patients and peremptorily opt[ing] for
speed over safety").
165. Greenberg, supra note 161, at 349; see plso Investigational New Drug, An
tibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Treatment Use and Sale, 52 Fed.
Reg. at 19,468 (acknowledging "the different risk-benefit considerations involved in
treating [immediately life-threatening] diseases"); DEGNAN, supra note 154, at 71. Fol
lowing the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments, the FDA manifested an "inflexible
interpretation of the provisions." DEGNAN, supra note 154, at 71. However, faced with
the realities of modern diseases like AIDS, the FDA has taken "a proactive flexible
interpretation" of the requirements of the FDCA. [d.
166. See supra Part I.A.2 for more information regarding the treatment use of
experimental drugs.
167. See, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL IN
TERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS (2007) (examining various methods of constitu
tional interpretation); 3 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND ITS INTERPRETATION (Jules L.
Coleman ed., 1994) (discussing constitutional theory and interpretation); LESLIE FRIED
MAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL THE
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preme Court precedent, is yes. The Constitution says nothing con
cerning the protection of family or reproductive autonomy, sexual
activity or orientation, or control over medical decisions-but
rights that fall under these general concepts have all been recog
nized as fundamental.1 68 The controversy over the inclusion of
these "unenumerated" rights is based on the ideological split be
tween those "who believe that the Court must confine [decisions] to
norms clearly stated or implied in the language of the Constitu
tion," and those "who believe that the Court may protect norms not
mentioned in the Constitution's text ...."169 Since these rights are
not specifically provided for in the Constitution, the Court must un
dertake a careful analysis to determine how and why these rights
fall under the umbrella of protections that the Constitution gives to
individual citizens.17o
The following sections will discuss how proposed fundamental
rights are analyzed. First is a discussion of how a potential funda
mental right is framed, as well as how the rights in the Abigail ALli
ance cases were framed. l71 The discussion will then proceed to the
ORY (1991) (analyzing constitutional theory and arguing in defense of a textualist
approach to interpreting the Constitution); JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL IN
TERPRETATION: ILLUSION AND REALITY (2001) (reviewing constitutional interpretation
throughout different time periods and approaches).
168. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 78, at 791-919; see also, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (right to the private sexual activity of consenting adults); Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (right of competent adults to refuse
medical treatment); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (right of parents to have
custody of their children); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to choose to termi
nate a pregnancy prior to viability); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to
decide whether to bear or beget children); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to
marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy includes matters
concerning contraception); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to con
trol educational upbringing); cf Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (no
fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide).
169. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, Interpreting the Constitution 1 (1987); see also BAR
BER & FLEMING, supra note 167 (discussing the topic of constitutional interpretation);
SHAMAN, supra note 167 (discussing different viewpoints of interpretation); Thomas C.
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975) (examining
the differences between pure textual interpretations of the Constitution and those inter
pretations that delve into inferences derived from the Constitution). Compare Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,194 (1986) (noting that the Supreme Court comes the closest
"to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law" that has no connec
tion to "the language or design of the Constitution"), with Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484
(noting that the Constitution contains "penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance," in which the Court has inferred
rights that cannot be found within the Constitution's four corners).
170. See supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
171. See infra Part II.A.
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historical guideposts employed by courts to determine whether the
defined right is "fundamental."l72 This section will also discuss the
Abigail Alliance II court's erroneous historical analysis of drug reg
ulation, as well as previous Supreme Court conclusions about the
history of drug regulation. 173 This Analysis will ultimately conclude
that the Abigail Alliance II court misinterpreted and misapplied the
fundamental rights analysis, and that a proper application would
have enabled the Alliance's arguments to succeed. 174
A.

Carefully Framing Rights into Extinction

Before a court can determine that a government regulation is
unconstitutional, it must first conclude that a constitutional right is
being infringed. To make this determination, the court must first
define the right that is before it. How the asserted right is defined
can dramatically sway the outcome of a court's analysis.175 Gener
ally, to permit the law to remain consistent and certain, an asserted
right must be grounded on some previously recognized right. 176
How broadly a right is defined is an important consideration that
can greatly impact a court's fundamental rights analysis. 177
Defining a previously recognized right in an abstract and broad
sense will make it easier for a newly asserted right to fall within
recognized precedent; however, an expansive definition could pro
duce undesired consequences, which would sway a court to reject
the description urged. 178 At the other end of the spectrum, nar
172. See infra Part II.B.
173. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
174. See infra Part II.B-C.
175. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("[T]he description
of the right is of crucial importance-too broad and a right becomes all-encompassing
and impossible to evaluate; too narrow and a right appears trivial."), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 1069 (2008).
176. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, On Reading the Constitution 72
(1991); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decision
making and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991) (addressing the various ap
proaches of Supreme Court Justices when confronted with precedent and its role in
constitutional decisionmaking); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571
(1987) (examining the concept of precedent and its impact on judicial decisions).
177. See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 176, at 73; Puckett, supra note 26, at 659
(noting that if the asserted right is given a narrow definition by the Court, the right is
usually not seen as fundamental, while a broader definition will denote a right that is
fundamental).
178. See Abigail Alliance fl, 495 F.3d at 701 n.5 ("If the asserted right is so broad
that it protects a person's efforts to save his life, it might subject to strict scrutiny any
government action that would affect the means by which he sought to do so, no matter
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rowly interpreting the right can lead to a similar resulP79 If the
asserted right is described too narrowly, its relation to the precedent
rights becomes so tenuous that making the inferential leap from
one right to the next becomes impossible. Likewise, if the prece
dent right is interpreted too narrowly, new rights will be unable to
fit within its definition.180
Both Abigail Alliance decisions provide an excellent demon
stration of how the interpretation of rights can influence a court's
holding. In finding support for a fundamental right to experimental
drugs, the initial appellate decision focused more attention on the
broader assertion that an individual has a right to take steps to pre
serve her life. 181 The focus on preservation of life was based on an
ability to make "informed decision[s]" and to "assume ... known or
unknown risks"182 concerning experimental drugs. This approach
focused more on why there should be access to experimental drugs.
how remote the chance of success."); TRIBE & DORF, supra note 176, at 73 ("The more
abstractly one states the already-protected right, the more likely it is that the claimed
right will be protected under its rubric."); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 724 (1997). Here, the respondents argued that "broad, individualistic principles ...
protect[] the 'liberty of competent, terminally ill adults to make end-of-life decisions
free of undue government interference.'" The Court framed the issue as "whether the
protections of the Due Process Clause include a right to commit suicide with another's
assistance." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 724.
179. See Mark S. Kende, The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty: South Africa
as a Model for the United States, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 209 (2006) (noting that
one of the differences between fundamental rights analysis in South Africa and in the
United States is the ability of our courts to achieve a limitation of rights through a
narrow interpretation of rights). Narrowly interpreting rights can achieve this result in
two ways. First, asserting a new right often requires the use of precedent. By defining a
right narrowly, the asserted right can no longer fit within precedent. Second, since
courts use evidence of history and tradition to support asserted rights, a court can de
fine a right so narrowly that finding history and tradition in support of the right is
nearly impossible.
180. ld.
181. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470, 477 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("The question
presented ... is whether the Due Process Clause protects the right of terminally ill
patients to make an informed decision that may prolong life, specifically by the use of
potentially life-saving new drugs ...." (emphasis added)), vacated en bane, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). But see Goldberg, supra note 24,
at 25 ("Under the court's approach, it will be difficult to find a tradition of government
regulation for any new technology.").
182. Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d at 484. Ultimately, the court concluded that
there was a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend
ment that recognizes:
[T]he right of terminally ill patients to make an informed decision that may
prolong life, specifically by use of potentially life-saving new drugs that the
FDA has yet to approve for commercial marketing but that the FDA has de
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In stark contrast, the en banc decision framed the right by fo
cusing on how a terminally ill individual would attempt to preserve
her life. The court reinterpreted the broader definition suggested
by the Alliance,183 summarizing it as "whether terminally ill pa
tients have a fundamental right to experimental drugs that have
passed Phase I clinical testing."184 This narrower definition
changed the course of the analysis and limited the ability of the
Alliance to rely on the fundamental right set forth in Cruzan, which
the court also narrowly defined. 185 The en banc court's narrow def
inition of the right at issue was an error because the protection of
rights under substantive due process concerns the protection of
broad concepts, not specific rights. Substantive due process guaran
tees privacy and liberty. The rights that are found to violate sub
stantive due process are those that infringe on these larger
guarantees-for example, the infringement on a pregnant woman's
privacy right in determining whether to terminate her pregnancy
prior to the fetus's viability.l86 It is only by application of these
broader concepts that specific actions garner the protection of the
Constitution. The Abigail Alliance II court failed to observe this,
which was readily demonstrated by the Supreme Court in both the
Cruzan and Glucksberg decisions. 187
In Glucksberg, the Court clarified the holding of Cruzan as a
recognition "that the ... Constitution would grant a competent per
son a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration
termined, after Phase I clinical human trials, are safe enough for further test
ing on a substantial number of human beings.
[d. at 477 (emphasis added).
183. Abigail Alliance ll, 495 F.3d at 701 ("Whether the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause embraces the right of a terminally ill patient with no remaining
approved treatment options to decide, in consultation with his or her own doctor,
whether to seek access to investigational medications that the [FDA] concedes are safe
and promising for substantial human testing." (emphasis added) (alteration in original)
(citing Appellants' Brief at 1, Abigail Alliance ll, 495 F.3d 695 (04-5350))).
184. [d.
185. [d. at 711 n.19 (defining the right in Cruzan as a "right to refuse lifesaving
hydration and nutrition" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
186. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) ("[T]he Court has recognized
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does
exist under the Constitution .... This right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
187. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (limiting Cruzan by not
including decisions that would allow an individual to initiate her own death); Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that liberty interests allow
individuals the right to make decisions regarding their own care).
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and nutrition,"188 which was supported by '''the [broader] right of a
competent individual to refuse medical treatment."'189 The Court
concluded that assisted suicide fell outside the type of decisions that
were deemed fundamentally personal in Cruzan. 190 Glucksberg's
clarification demonstrates that Cruzan recognized a right to make
decisions regarding an individual's medical treatment; yet it limited
the decision by excluding the right to intentionally hasten death.
The broader fundamental right of Cruzan 191 was not going to pro
vide a shield for the specific act in Glucksberg.1 92
This distinction is important because the Abigail Alliance II
court failed to invoke the broader concepts of Cruzan entirely. In
stead, the court relegated its discussion of the precedent to a foot
note and focused on the specific medical treatment that the
Alliance was ultimately attempting to access. 193 In Abigail Alliance
II, the en banc court viewed Cruzan as providing a right to refuse
treatment, not a right to make a decision regarding treatment,
which is arguably inherent in the Cruzan Court's analysis. 194 This
micro approach focused specifically on what the petitioner in
188. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279).
189. Id. at 724 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277).
190. Id. at 705; see also Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical
Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 311 (2008) (noting that the
Supreme Court supported a fundamental right "to refuse even life-saving medical treat
ment" in Cruzan, but "declined to extend" this right to medical decisions designed to
"hasten death" in Glucksberg).
191. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (right to refuse treatment and make medical
decisions) .
192. Glucksberg; 521 U.S. 702 (physician-assisted suicide).
193. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 711 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
194. Id. (characterizing the right in Cruzan as "protecting individual freedom
from life-saving, but forced, medical treatment"); see also Thomas B. McAffee, Over
coming Lochner in the Twenty-First Century: Taking Both Rights and Popular Sover
eignty Seriously as We Seek to Secure Equal Citizenship and Promote the Public Good,
42 U. RICH. L. REV. 597,617 (2008) (noting that the decision in Cruzan was grounded
in a longstanding "legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical
treatment" (emphasis added) (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725)); Rahul Rajkumar,
A Human Rights Approach to Routine Provider-Initiated HIV Testing, 7 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 319, 348 (2007) (characterizing the decision in Cruzan as
"a constitutional Substantive Due Process right to make decisions of critical importance
to one's own destiny" (emphasis added)); Puckett, supra note 26, at 650 (observing that
Cruzan and Abigail Alliance are both grounded in "the patient's right to make the
decision about her life free from governmental interference" (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en banc,
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cere. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008))).
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Cruzan was seeking, rather than the macro view of why that partic
ular decision was fundamental. The court, therefore, retreated
from recognizing the validity of the Alliance's Cruzan argument. 195
As a result, the issue was not viewed through the lens of protecting
life through personal decisions, but more narrowly as whether there
was a right to access experimental drugs.
This characterization denied the Alliance the benefit of
Cruzan's previously recognized fundamental right. Instead, under
the approach of the AbigaiL Alliance II court, the right asserted by
the Alliance would have to stand on its own merits in order to be
recognized. 196 The right in AbigaiL Alliance II should properly have
focused on the conceptual "why" analysis, and not on the specific
"how" analysis. By mischaracterizing the asserted right, the en
banc court substantially impaired the entire analysis-and also
demonstrated the ease of avoiding many issues under traditional
fundamental rights analysis. Fundamentally, the Alliance was not
asserting a right of access to experimental drugs-it was asserting
the existence of an individual liberty interest in the protection of life
and, ultimately, the decisions regarding life. 197 Not only did Abigail
Alliance II frame the right too narrowly, it also failed to accurately
consider the history of drug regulation.
195. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 711 n.19.
196. Interestingly, had the en bane court addressed the Alliance's argument
under the context of Cruzan as it was clarified by the Supreme Court in Glucksberg, the
Alliance could argue that the type of decision they were seeking would fall squarely
within the holding of Cruzan, without expanding that holding. In Cruzan, the Court
held that the decision to refuse treatment, which would lead to the death of the individ
ual, would be a protected medical decision. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261. Additionally, Gluck
sberg's guidepost limited Cruzan by holding that an individual would not have a right to
cause his own death. Glucksberg,521 U.S. 702. Reading both cases together, it seems
the Court would recognize a fundamental right to make decisions that will result in
one's own death, but not decisions made with the express intent to die. The en bane
court in Abigail Alliance focused on the possibility that experimental drugs could cause
death (due to limited information on safety and efficacy). Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d
at 706. However, the intent of the Alliance is not to cause death, but to attempt to
prevent or delay it. Therefore, the Alliance's argument would not reach as far as the
petitioner in Glucksberg attempted to take the Cruzan analysis (intent to cause death).
Rather, the Alliance's argument would only possibly reach to the extent of Cruzan
(certainty that death would occur).
197. See LARRY YACKLE, Regulatory Rights: Supreme Court Activism, the Pub
lic Interest, and the Making of Constitutional Law 99-100 (2007) (explaining that under
fundamental rights analysis, the right is enforcement of due process, with the real focus
being the "liberty interest" the plaintiff is trying to protect); see also Abigail Alliance I,
445 F.3d 470 (defining the right as the protection of life); Puckett, supra note 26 (argu
ing that the right that would be provided to the terminally ill is a right of self
preservation ).
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Historical Myths and Questionable Traditions-The En Banc
Court's Analysis of Drug Regulations

The "guidepost" of fundamental rights analysis, according to
the Court in Washington v. Glucksberg, is the examination of his
tory and tradition, which is used to determine if an asserted right
has historically been protected by law. 198 In Abigail Alliance II, the
court noted that an omission of government regulation or interfer
ence throughout history could lend support for a right that is deeply
rooted. 199 The absence of regulation is viewed cautiously, however,
because "the absence of positive laws encroaching upon a right
does not indicate the fundamentality of that right."20o Conversely,
laws that tend to negate the asserted right do not automatically pre
clude the existence of a fundamental right.201 If that were the case,
"governments would be free to violate constitutional norms by per
sisting in a pattern of unconstitutional enactments."202 Taken to
gether, these observations lead to the conclusion that historical
treatment is an ambiguous standard open to numerous methods of
interpretation. 203
198. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503
U.S. 115, 125 (1992»; see also LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM 198-99 (1996) ("[R)ights and privileges may be presumed to exist, and
hence less easily erased, if they can be demonstrated to have been part of the 'history
and traditions of the people.'" (quoting James C. Mohr, Historically Based Legal Briefs:
Observations ofa Participant in the Webster Process, PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1990, at
19, 20». Analysis shows that the recognition of an asserted right as fundamental does
not require firm grounding in precedent or statute, but a court must be able to infer that
protection is warranted based upon history and legal traditions.
199. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 706 ("[A) lack of government interference
throughout history might be some evidence that a right is deeply rooted."). But see
Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First Amendment,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 901 (1993) ("The Court is often explicit in stating that rights
should be protected only if there has been a tradition of judicial safeguards ....").
200. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 176, at 99; see also Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at
707 ("A prior lack of regulation suggests that we must exercise care in evaluating the
untested assertion of a constitutional right to be free from new regulation.").
201. See TRlBE & DORF, supra note 176, at 99. But see Chemerinsky, supra note
199, at 912 ("[T)he more successful a litigant is in showing widespread, long-term viola
tions of a right, the less likely the Court will protect it because of society's traditional
posture concerning it. ... [T)he Court uses the absence of historical protection of a right
as the basis for refusing current judicial protection.").
202. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 176, at 99.
203. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
127-28 (2001) (noting that historians are often critical when judges use historical analy
sis because they use facts subjectively as a means to bolster arguments); KALMAN, supra
note 198, at 196 ("[L)awyers may favor sweeping interpretations [of history) more than
nitpicking historians."); Chemerinsky, supra note 199, at 913 ("The Court picks and
chooses from its reading of history and selects those practices that confirm the conclu
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Despite the ambiguities presented by searching for a historical
basis on which to ground fundamental rights, the Abigail Alliance II
court based the crux of its decision on a lack of evidence that the
asserted right is "deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradi
tions.''204 The following sections will examine the court's analysis
and the fallacy behind its conclusion "that our Nation has long ex
pressed interest in drug regulation."205 The history of drug regula
tion, which was outlined in Part I.e., only reflects a series of recent
developments during the twentieth century.
1.

The Misguided Approach of the Abigail Alliance II
Court

Because the en banc court framed the issue as a right of "ac
cess to experimental drugs," the analysis focused on whether there
was a history and tradition in this country that allowed "access to
drugs that have not yet been proven effective" or "safe."206 In the
eyes of the court, the Alliance needed to demonstrate a history of
access to unsafe and ineffective drugs, which is clearly an impossi
sion that it wants to reach."); Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the
Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1989) (examining
the ambiguities and shortcomings of historical analysis in interpreting the Constitution);
William M. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of
History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227, 267 (1988) (noting that the facts that make up history
are essentially meaningless without interpretation, which is subjective to the individual
historian). This ambiguity is evident "because historical traditions can be indetermi
nate, and because even when we discover a clear historical tradition it is hardly obvious
what the existence of that tradition tells us about the Constitution's meaning." TRIBE &
DORF, supra note 176, at 100. But see William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237, 1238-39 (1986) (defending legal "in
terpretivism" as a method used to interpret the meaning of the Constitution).
204. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 711; see also TRIBE & DORF, supra note 176,
at 98-101 (discussing the ambiguities of historical analysis).
205. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 703.
206. ld. Although the Abigail Alliance II court relied heavily on safety and effec
tiveness, it failed to address the limitations of these standards. The FDCA was not
intended to regulate doctors and pharmacists. Off-label use arises when a doctor
prescribes an approved medication for a use other than the drug's designated use.
David G. Adams, The Food and Drug Administration's Regulation of Health Care Pro
fessionals, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 423;
Salbu, supra note 15, at 188. This reality of drug regulation raises important questions
regarding the Abigail Alliance litigation. In light of the Abigail Alliance II decision, it is
difficult to reconcile how medications that have been tested and approved for narrow
uses can be used for other, extraneous uses. See Miller, supra note 15 (noting "that
terminally ill patients, especially those with cancer, are treated with experimental drugs
all the time" under off-label uses). Drugs being administered for off-label "uses" have
not been proven to be safer or more effective for the specific off-label use than a pre
approved and experimental drug has for any use.

572

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:535

ble task. 207 Any such argument was doomed to fail because a right
to access ineffective and unsafe drugs could not have existed before
drugs were tested and labeled as effective and safe. 208 The very
concept of an "experimental" drug-or an untested drug-did not
enter the lexicon of drug legislation until the passage of the FDCA.
Since "experimental" drugs are a relatively recent concept, the
court should have focused on the history and tradition of relevant
time periods, which would have demonstrated that there is a histor
ical basis for accessing "experimental" drugs that is predicated on a
lack of regulation. 209 The historical evidence of drug regulation to
which the Abigail Alliance II court pointed, however, belies its own
requirement that the Alliance demonstrate a "tradition of access to
drugs that have not yet been proven effective, but also ... not yet
been proven safe. "210 Much of the history and tradition referenced
in the en banc decision failed to address the court's assertion of a
longstanding history of drug regulation. 211
The Abigail Alliance II court pointed to regulations aimed at
the qualifications for pharmacists and doctors, but those regulations
did not address the safety and efficacy of drugs. 212 Indeed, "by the
1830's almost all the states had statutes requiring examination and
licensing of physicians ," but there is little evidence of legislation
207. Experimental drugs, according to the current FDA regulations, are drugs
that have not yet been approved by the FDA. See 21 U.S.c. § 355 (2000). The FDA
only approves drugs that have passed the clinical trial process, which requires manufac
turers to demonstrate the drug's safety and effectiveness. ld. Therefore, a history and
tradition of access to unsafe and ineffective drugs would demonstrate a tradition of
access to experimental drugs.
208. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.c. §§ 301-392) (proof of a drug's effectiveness required after 1962);
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codi
fied as amended at 21 U.S.c. §§ 301-392) (proof of a drug's safety required after 1938);
see also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 n.8 (1979) (acknowledging that
drug effectiveness was not a requirement prior to 1962 and safety was not required
prior to 1938).
209. The court in Abigail Alliance 1 certainly believed that this time period sup
ported the asserted fundamental right. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to De
velopmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, (Abigail Alliance /), 445 F.3d 470, 472 (D.C. Cir.
2006), vacated en bane, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069
(2008). Most importantly, a thorough analysis would demonstrate that the FDCA,
while requiring a demonstration of safety for new drugs, was very limited in controlling
drug safety prior to the Drug Amendments of 1962. See Federal Food, Drug and Cos
metic Act of 1938.
210. Abigail Alliance 11, 495 F.3d at 703.
211. ld. at 703-07; see supra text accompanying note 104.
212. Abigail Alliance 11, 495 F.3d at 704.
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aimed at the safety and efficacy issue.2 13 The appellate court's con
clusion that the "Nation has long expressed an interest in drug reg
ulation" may be accurate, but any resulting legislation did not
regulate the safety and effectiveness of drugs. 214 An "interest in
drug regulation" is not the same as evidence of drug regulation,
especially when this "interest" is used to justify the constitutionality
of regulations that have a dire impact on citizens. 215
In addition to targeting inappropriate historical indicators in its
analysis, the Abigail Alliance II court also required a showing of a
specific historical basis for access to experimental drugs. 216 The
court viewed any regulation of drugs as a dispositive indicator that
there was no right of access to experimental drugs. 217 However,
this treatment overreaches the purpose of turning to historical anal
ysis. History serves as a "guidepost" to fundamental rights analy
sis-not as a hurdle that must first be passed. 218 Requiring an
affirmative showing that a right has been historically protected pre
supposes that prior generations would recognize any and all funda
mental rights that contemporary generations would recognize. This
approach, however, could not realistically confront numerous issues
that arise due to technological advances, especially in the area of
medicine.
2.

The Supreme Court's Recognition of Safety and
Effectiveness in Drug Regulation Focuses on the
Past Sixty Years.

The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of drug safety
further evidences the proper historical analysis of major federal
213. KREMERS, URDANG & SONNEDECKER, supra note 104, at 180 (emphasis
added). These "new drugs" were considered "experimental" until the limited safety
requirements of the 1938 Act were met.
214. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 703. Furthermore, it has been observed that
prior to the FDCA, "consumers could simply buy any nonnarcotic drug they desired,"
which undermines the appellate court's conclusion concerning drug regulation. TEMIN,
supra note 116, at 47; see also supra text accompanying notes 104 and 129 (providing
further analysis of the en banc court's asserted "history").
215. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 703.
216. The court in Abigail Alliance II stated:
[T]o succeed on its claim of a fundamental right of access for the terminally ill
to experimental drugs, the Alliance must show not only that there is a tradition
of access to drugs that have not yet been proven effective, but also a tradition
of access to drugs that have not yet been proven safe.
[d. (emphasis added).
217. [d.
218. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
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drug regulation that Abigail Alliance II should have focused on. 219
In United States v. Johnson, the Court concluded that effectiveness
was not required by the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906.220 Ac
cording to the Court, "misleading statements" concerning the
claimed effects of a drug were not considered a misbranding under
the Act. 221 If misleading claims regarding the effectiveness of drugs
were not subject to the provisions of the Pure Food and Drugs Act,
it was because the Act was silent on effectiveness and did not in
tend to regulate the effectiveness of drugs.
Later, in Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., the
Supreme Court observed that regulation of drug safety and efficacy
began with the FDCA and the 1962 drug amendments. 222 In Wein
berger, the Court examined whether studies for the drug Lutrexin
were sufficient to satisfy the effectiveness requirements needed for
the continued approval of a new drug application. 223 The Court ac
knowledged that prior to 1938 there were no regulations preventing
a manufacturer of a new drug from introducing the drug into the
219. See supra Part I.e.
220. United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488,495 (1911). In Johnson, a drug man
ufacturer included a claim on the label of the drug "that the contents were effective in
curing cancer," which the government argued was misbranding under the Act because
the claimed effectiveness could not be substantiated. Id. The Court concluded that the
language of the act was not intended to cover "all possible false statements." Id. at 497.
According to the Court's interpretation, Congress "was much more likely to regulate
commerce in food and drugs with reference to plain matter of fact ... than to distort the
uses of its constitutional power to establishing criteria in regions where opinions are far
apart." Id. at 498. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Holmes implied that
the "claims were stated to be opinions, which were not capable of being proven right or
wrong" and thus were "protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech." TEMIN, supra note 116, at 33.
221. Johnson, 221 U.S. at 496.
222. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973).
223. /d. at 615-16. The New Drug Application (NDA) requirement under the
original act was a much more liberal requirement than it is under its current form:

This NDA was to include "full reports of investigations which have been made
to show whether or not such a drug is safe for use." If the submitted
paperwork was satisfactory, the application was allowed to become effective.
Between 1938 and 1962 about 13,000 NDAs were submitted and about 70 per
cent were allowed to be marketed.
RAY & KSIR, supra note 147, at 62. The NDA requirement under the original act
served more as a rubber stamp for drug companies than as a protection for the general
public. See Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Procedures o/the Food and Drug Adminis
tration, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 15, at 43 (noting
that Weinberger dealt primarily with "applying the effectiveness requirements of the
1962 Drug Amendments to previously approved prescription drugs" as a basis for re
moving FDA approval for pre-approved drugs).
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marketplace. 224 Additionally, the FDCA "provided for regulatory
clearance of drugs prior to marketing ... in the interests of public
safety,"225 and that "the 1938 Act permitted evaluation of a new
drug solely on the grounds of its safety."226 It was not until the 1962
drug amendments that the FDA had the authority to "evaluate
drugs for effectiveness as well as safety."227 At this point, the FDA
became a "gatekeeper" to market access of new drugs. 228
The Abigail Alliance II court asserted that the Alliance's argu
ment concerning the effectiveness of drugs failed because, "as a
matter of history, at least some drug regulation prior to 1962 ad
dressed efficacy" and "an arguably limited history of efficacy regu
lation prior to 1962 does not establish a fundamental right of access
to unproven drugs."229 The court, however, provided no examples
of regulations concerning the effectiveness of drugs in support of
this assertion, and only acknowledged "that Congress and the FDA
have continually responded to new risks," and that "[r]ecent gov
ernment efficacy regulation has reflected Congress's exercise of its
well-established power to regulate ...."230 The court also failed to
take into consideration the efforts made to ease the effect of the
hurdles placed on access to unapproved drugS. 231
224. Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 623; supra notes 119-129 and accompanying text.
225. Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 623; see also RAY & KSIR, supra note 147, at 62 ("A
critical change in the 1938 law was the requirement that before a new drug could be
marketed its manufacturer must test it for toxicity. ").
226. Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 615 (emphasis added). But see Janssen, supra note
119, at 438 (arguing that effectiveness requirements had been around since the Massa
chusetts Bay Colony in 1630).
227. Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added); see also RAY & KSIR, supra
note 147, at 63 ("The most important change was one requiring that every new drug be
demonstrated to be effective for the illnesses mentioned on the label."); U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, http://www.fda.
gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) ("Kefauver-Harris
Drug Amendments passed to ensure drug efficacy and greater drug safety. For the first
time, drug manufacturers are required to prove to FDA the effectiveness of their products
...." (emphasis added». But see Note, Drug Efficacy, supra note 121, at 186 (noting
that "the Food and Drug Act of 1906 was amended in 1912 to declare drugs making
fraudulent claims of efficacy to be misbranded" in response to the Supreme Court deci
sion in United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 498 (1911».
228. RAY & KSIR, supra note 147, at 62.
229. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach (Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. de
nied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
230. !d.
231. See supra notes 161-165 and accompanying text (discussing the 1988 Drug
Amendments); see also Greenberg, supra note 161, at 334 ("The FDA's new drug ap
proval regime ... [is] focused on making experimental drugs available more rapidly,
both on a pre-approval and post-approval basis.").
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Johnson, Weinberger, and Rutherford may not support the Alli
ance's argument, but these cases certainly dilute the rationale of the
en banc court's decision. 232 The court's analysis of history and tra
dition ignored many key factors necessary for a comprehensive
analysis of the right at issue. If the en banc court had approached
the analysis more thoroughly, it would have discovered a void in
regulations during the first half of our nation's existence. That pe
riod was followed by the gradual tightening of control, which led to
litigation over access to various drugs. 233
C.

The Right Asserted Falls Under the Umbrella of Cruzan and
Should Be Recognized as Fundamental

The Abigail Alliance, as well as the initial appeals court deci
sion, characterized the asserted right as analogous to the fundamen
tal right recognized in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health. 234 The Abigail Alliance I court concluded that the liberty
precedent of the Supreme Court "indicates that the right claimed
by the Alliance can be inferred from the Court's conclusion in
Cruzan . .. that an individual has a due process right to refuse life
sustaining medical treatment."235 If individuals have the right to
make decisions and take risks that would clearly lead to their
deaths, then they also have the right to make decisions and assume
risks that might lead to their deaths.
The Cruzan Court stated that "[t]he choice between life and
death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming
finality," which allowed the state to impose requirements to protect
that choice. 236 In supporting this decision, the Court determined
that a state can require elevated evidentiary requirements of the
intent of the patient as a means to protect the "personal element"
232. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 (1979) (recognizing that
the 1962 Drug Amendments first established requirements for drug effectiveness and
the FDCA of 1938 first required evidence of safety);. Weinberger, 412 U.S. at 612-14
(noting that drug regulations did not begin examinations for safety prior to 1938 and
effectiveness prior to 1962); Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (arguing that the Pure Food and
Drugs Act of 1906 did not require that a drug be effective).
233. See discussion supra Part I.B-C.
234. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); see supra note 86
for a discussion of the fundamental right at issue in Cruzan.
235. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en banc 495
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
236. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281 (emphasis added).
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of the choice. 237 In recognizing that "the choice between life and
death" is "deeply personal," the Court set these types of decisions
apart as ones that should be left up to the individual.238
To support its holding, the Court in Cruzan noted that an in
trusion into one's body without consent is an assault, which creates
liability in the perpetrator. 239 The requirement of informed con
sent, which is a basic fixture in American law, leads to "[t]he logical
corollary ... that the patient generally possesses the right not to
consent."240 Simply put, if a doctor is required to obtain a patient's
informed consent prior to administering treatment, the patient is
equally free to withhold consent. It is the consent of the patient
that is the dispositive factor regarding treatment. The bodily integ
rity doctrine was recognized by the Cruzan Court as a longstanding
principle that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable au
thority of law."241 The right the Alliance argued for rises to the
level of that described by the Court in Cruzan and should likewise
be recognized. 242
The Alliance sought a decision that is remarkably analogous to
Cruzan-there are only a few minor conceptual differences. The
first conceptual difference, and the most limiting to the Alliance's
case, is the foundation on which the Cruzan case was based. The
Cruzan Court pointed to a common law right to bodily integrity,
which includes a requirement of a patient's informed consent. 243
The Alliance lacks an analogous common law right according to the
appellate court. 244 A second difference is the type of government
237. [d. Ironically, instead of allowing the government to take measures to pre
serve a terminally ill patient's decision, which was the concern of the Court in Cruzan,
the court in Abigail Alliance 1/ allowed the government to prevent the patient's right to
make such a decision. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v.
von Eschenbach (Abigail Alliance 1/), 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
238. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
239. [d. at 269.
240. [d. at 270.
241. [d. at 269 (alteration in original) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
242. See id.
243. [d.
244. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach (Abigail Alliance 1/), 495 FJd 695, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. de
nied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). The Alliance argued that the common law doctrine of
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action at issue. Under Cruzan, the government would be standing
aside while the terminally ill patient refused treatment, while Abi
gail Alliance would require the government to stand aside while the
terminally ill patient received treatment from a willing drug
manufacturer.
Additionally, there is another minor, but notable difference be
tween the Alliance's asserted right and the right delineated by the
Supreme Court in Cruzan. In Cruzan, the right permitted would
allow an individual to dictate his own treatment and make a deci
sion that would result in death. 245 The Alliance is seeking treat
ment that could result in death. The premise of Cruzan is that an
individual can refuse viable treatments while the Alliance seeks the
ability to obtain further treatment when all viable treatments are
extinguished. Cruzan permits an individual to dictate the measures
that may be taken to sustain his life. Abigail Alliance II limits those
measures if they are based on experimental medications.
This is an inconsistent result. If Cruzan allows an individual to
refuse treatments that sustain life, thereby choosing death, then an
individual should also be permitted to seek treatments that may
sustain life. Since "[t]he choice between life and death is a deeply
personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality," the indi
vidual should be permitted to choose how to face death-either re
solved to the "finality," or by pursuing all potentially lifesaving
actions. 246 The FDA should be concerned with the safety and effi
cacy of drugs, but not act as a barrier to treatments that could pro
duce positive results for an individual whose death is certain
without such treatment.
Cruzan ultimately stands for allowing a competent person -to
make an informed decision that she understands will lead ulti
mately to her death. 247 The decision in Abigail Alliance II limits
the choices for a terminally ill individual to FDA-approved medica
tions. The en banc court has determined that a decision can only be
informed if the FDA determines that the drugs sought are safe and
effective. 248 A decision based on the best available information is
necessity, the tort of intentional interference with rescue, and the right to self-defense
lead, conceptually, to a right of self-preservation, which has its roots in the common
law. The en banc court, however, dismissed these common law duties as failing to pro
vide support for a fundamental right to access experimental medication. Id. at 707-10.
245. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 28I.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
See id.; supra text accompanying note 196.
See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 703. The court in Abigail Alliance /I
arrived at the conclusion that terminally ill patients do not have a fundamental right to
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not sufficient to meet the requirements of the en banc court. In
essence, the court added another requirement-the decision must
be informed and FDA-approved.
The Abigail Alliance II court acknowledged that the purpose
of Phase I of the clinical trial process is designed in large part to
"gather[] data on effectiveness" and that the "primary focus is to
determine whether the drug is safe enough for continued human
testing."249 The court deferred to the judgment of the FDA con
cerning what level of risk the individual patient should be willing to
accept with an end-of-life decision. The premise of Cruzan logi
cally leads to the ability of a terminally ill patient, with no other
viable treatment option, to make a decision based on the informa
tion available to him at the time the decision is made.
CONCLUSION

The FDA regulations governing the availability of experimen
tal drugs achieve important state purposes. They ensure safety and
efficacy and hold manufacturers accountable for the drugs they pro
duce. Indeed, it is these important purposes that fuel opposition to
the type of access that the Alliance is attempting to gain. 250 These
regulations, however, impose burdens on terminally ill people
whose lives literally depend on access to new medications that
could prove to be lifesaving. The initial appellate decision, Abigail
Alliance I, found, through sound reasoning, "that an individual
must ... be free to decide for herself whether to assume any known
or unknown risks of taking a medication that might prolong her
life. "251 This is especially important for terminally ill patients,
whose circumstances drastically alter the balance between the po
tential benefits and the detriments of that treatment.
It is true that experimental medications will not always result
in a benefit to a terminally ill patient. Yet, experimental treatments
have worked miracles. Take, for example, the recent story of pro
fessional football player Kevin Everett. On September 9, 2007, Ke
vin made a tackle during a game and suffered a "fracture
the access of experimental drugs because those drugs have not been proven safe or
effective for their intended purpose. [d.
249. [d. at 698 (citing Phases of an Investigation, 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1) (2008)).
250. Foreman, supra note 8 (noting that providing access to experimental drugs
would undermine the system of ensuring drug safety and efficacy).
251. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, (Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470, 484 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en bane, 495
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008).
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dislocation of [his] cervical vertebrae"-an injury that usually re
sults in paralysis. 252 Kevin was treated with controversial and
ground breaking medical care, which may have played a significant
role in his ability to walk again. 253 The treatment he received has
not been proven safe, and its effectiveness is not certain because of
the additional care he received for his injury. Equally unknown, of
course, is what condition he would be in today if the experimental
treatment had not been provided.
The choice by a terminally ill individual to undergo treatment
using currently unproven medications is no different from other
medical choices protected as fundamental rights-and the risks are
often the same. By denying terminally ill individuals the right to
access potentially lifesaving medications, the government is making
the individual's choice for her, rather than giving her the freedom
to make her own choice. Instead of recognizing that a person has a
right to fend off death by trying every possible cure, the FDA regu
lations remove options that would give hope to those who need it
most. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what risks would outweigh
any potential benefits when the only other alternative is death. Re
gardless, the decision to accept these risks should be vested in the
individual and not the government.
Matthew R. Madara

252. Tim Layden, Kevin Everett: The Road Back,
2007, at 57, 58, 62.
253. Id. at 58.
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